



Daniel J. Hemel† & Gregg D. Polsky†† 
A recent rise in the volume of corporate share repurchases has 
prompted calls for changes to the rules governing stock buybacks. These 
calls for reform are animated by concerns that buybacks enrich corporate 
executives at the expense of productive investment. This emerging anti-
buyback movement includes prominent politicians as well as academics 
and Republicans as well as Democrats. The primary focus of buyback crit-
ics has been on securities-law changes to deter repurchases, with only pass-
ing mention of potential tax-law solutions. 
 This Article critically examines the policy arguments against buy-
backs and arrives at a mixed verdict. On the one hand, claims that buybacks 
reduce corporate investment and inappropriately reward executives turn 
out to be poorly supported. On the other hand, the Article identifies legit-
imate tax-related concerns about the rising buyback tide. Buybacks exac-
erbate two of the U.S. tax system’s most severe flaws. The first is the “Mark 
Zuckerberg problem”: the effective nontaxation of firm founders on what 
is essentially labor income. The second is what we call the “Panama Papers 
problem”: the use of U.S. capital markets by investors in offshore tax ha-
vens to generate tax-free returns. 
 Our search for solutions to the Mark Zuckerberg and Panama Pa-
pers problems brings us back to a prescient 1969 article by then-Yale Law 
School professor Marvin Chirelstein. The main innovation of Chirelstein’s 
article was to explain how buybacks could be taxed the same way as divi-
dends at the shareholder level. Chirelstein’s proffered justification for his 
proposal has obsolesced in the succeeding five decades, but the proposal 
nonetheless provides a technically elegant framework for addressing two 
of the modern-day U.S. tax system’s major ills. 
 This Article evaluates Chirelstein’s proposal and updates it for the 
twenty-first century. We outline the mechanics of the proposal, suggest a 
range of tweaks, and show how adoption of the proposal would substan-
tially improve the U.S. capital-taxation regime. Along the way, we 
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illustrate the benefits of incrementalism both in tax policy and tax scholar-
ship. Progress, we argue, often involves reviving the best ideas of yester-
year rather than writing on a blank slate. 
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Introduction 
Stock buybacks announced by U.S. corporations hit an all-time high 
in 2018, topping $1 trillion for the first time.1 The pace of share repurchases 
                                                                                                                                             
 1. See Matt Egan, Corporate America Gives out a Record $1 Trillion in Stock Buybacks, 
CNN (Dec. 17, 2018, 4:44 PM EST), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/17/investing/stock-buybacks-
trillion-dollars/index.html [https://perma.cc/N369-JKS5]. 
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slowed slightly in 2019, but buybacks that year remained the single biggest 
source of demand for U.S. public equity.2 And although the onset of the 
COVID-19 crisis put a hold on many stock-repurchase programs,3 the 
pause appears to be only temporary.4 A number of high-profile firms—
including Apple,5 Starbucks,6 and Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hatha-
way7—have continued buying back their own shares through the pan-
demic. 
While buybacks often raise cheers from investors and analysts, rec-
ord-breaking share repurchases also have become a cause of consternation 
among politicians and policymakers who fear that stock buybacks pad the 
pockets of corporate executives and divert funds from productive invest-
ment. Several former candidates for the Democratic Party’s 2020 
                                                                                                                                             
 2. See Share Buybacks to Slide 15% in 2019 and 5% Next Year, Says Goldman, CHIEF 
INVESTMENT OFFICER (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.ai-cio.com/news/share-buybacks-slide-15-
2019-5-next-year-says-goldman [https://perma.cc/ZD7K-ZE49]. 
 3. See Grace Maral Burnett, Analysis: S&P 500 Buyback Suspensions, Dividend Cuts 
Raise Flags, BLOOMBERG L. (May 22, 2020, 6:29 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloom-
berg-law-analysis/analysis-s-p-500-buyback-suspensions-dividend-cuts-raise-flags 
[https://perma.cc/4LV7-G9P9]. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) 
Act signed into law in March 2020 provides that firms receiving direct loans and loan guarantees 
from the U.S. Treasury Department cannot repurchase shares for twelve months after the date 
that the loan or loan guarantee is no longer outstanding. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4003(c)(2)(E), 134 Stat. 281, 471 (2020). The repurchase re-
striction does not apply to firms that received forgivable loans through the $669 billion Payroll 
Protection Program (PPP). Dozens of public companies received PPP loans; many—though not 
all—returned their loans under public pressure. See, e.g., Allison Levitsky, Publicly Traded Tesla 
Rival Nio Among the Largest PPP Loan Recipients in Silicon Valley, New Data Shows, SILICON 
VALLEY BUS. J. (July 8, 2020, 7:19 AM PDT), https://www.bizjour-
nals.com/sanjose/news/2020/07/08/nio-ppp-loan-public-companies-silicon-valley.html 
[https://perma.cc/CMP4-Q8SP?type=image]; Mark Niquette, Bailout List Includes Firms with 




 4. See Grace Maral Burnett, Analysis: S&P 500 Buyback Suspensions Dropped to Zero 
in June, BLOOMBERG L. (July 8, 2020, 4:37 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-
analysis/analysis-s-p-500-buyback-suspensions-dropped-to-zero-in-june [https://perma.cc/Z63Q-
QHMJ]. 
 5. See Jessica Bursztynsky, Apple Now Has $192.8 Billion in Cash on Hand, Down from 
Last Quarter, CNBC (Apr. 30, 2020, 4:41 PM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/apple-q2-
2020-cash-hoard-heres-how-much-apple-has-on-hand.html [https://perma.cc/B9TQ-4XV3]. 
 6. See Daniel B. Kline, Starbucks Remains Committed to Share Buybacks, NASDAQ 
(Mar. 20, 2020, 1:28 PM EST), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/starbucks-remains-committed-to-
share-buybacks-2020-03-20 [https://perma.cc/Q455-DVUB].  
 7. See Wayne Duggan, Why Warren Buffett May Have Changed His Tune on Berkshire 





presidential nomination—including Senators Bernie Sanders,8 Elizabeth 
Warren,9 Cory Booker,10 and Kirsten Gillibrand11—put forward or en-
dorsed proposals to restrict corporate share repurchases or to limit the 
ability of corporate insiders to participate in buybacks. The party’s even-
tual nominee, now-President-elect Joe Biden, called on CEOs to halt buy-
backs for a year after COVID-19 struck.12 Robert Jackson, Jr., a Demo-
cratic member of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) until 
2020, has described trading around the time of buyback announcements as 
“troubling” and called on the SEC to “reexamine our rules in this area.”13 
And antipathy toward buybacks crosses party lines. On the Republican 
side, Senator Marco Rubio of Florida has called for tax-law changes to end 
the current “tax code’s favoritism” for buybacks over dividends.14 Presi-
dent Donald Trump, who arguably added fuel to the buyback trend by 
signing the 2017 tax cuts into law, told reporters in March 2020 that he 
“never liked stock buybacks” either.15  
Attention to buybacks from presidents and prominent politicians is a 
recent phenomenon, but scholars of tax law have been thinking about the 
problems posed by share repurchases for decades. Last year marked the 
                                                                                                                                             
 8. See Chuck Schumer & Bernie Sanders, Opinion, Schumer and Sanders: Limit Corpo-
rate Stock Buybacks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/opin-
ion/chuck-schumer-bernie-sanders.html [https://perma.cc/RJ66-MLCM] (“Our bill will prohibit a 
corporation from buying back its own stock unless it invests in workers and communities first, 
including things like paying all workers at least $15 an hour, providing seven days of paid sick 
leave, and offering decent pensions and more reliable health benefits.”). 
 9. See Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Share-
holders, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018, 7:01 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-only-to-shareholders-1534287687 [https://perma.cc/Z6DV-
YXKE] (proposing that directors and officers be barred from selling company shares within three 
years of a buyback). 
 10. See Worker Dividend Act of 2018, S. 2505, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2d Sess. 2018) (intro-
duced by Senator Booker) (proposing that publicly traded corporation be required to pay a 
“worker dividend” equal to the lesser of the amount paid by the corporation to repurchase its 
securities on the open market or 50% of U.S. earnings above $250 million). 
 11. Senators Gillibrand and Warren were cosponsors of the Reward Work Act, which 
would have repealed a Securities and Exchange Commission regulatory safe harbor for corporate 
share repurchases. See Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).  
 12. See Jacob Pramuk, Joe Biden Urges ‘Every CEO in America’ to Commit to No Stock 
Buybacks for a Year, CNBC (Mar. 20, 2020, 11:14 AM EST), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/20/coronavirus-updates-joe-biden-urges-no-stock-buybacks-for-a-
year.html [https://perma.cc/6NG5-NRP2]. 
 13. Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the Center for 
American Progress on Stock Buybacks and Corporate Cashouts (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-jackson-061118 [https://perma.cc/3Z4E-8EQG]. 
 14. Marco Rubio, America Needs to Restore Dignity of Work, ATLANTIC (Dec. 13, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/help-working-class-voters-us-must-
value-work/578032 [https://perma.cc/35PX-LSYK]. 
 15. Steve Holland & Alexandra Alper, Trump Slams Companies for Using U.S. Tax 
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fiftieth anniversary of the seminal article on buybacks in the tax-law liter-
ature: Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the Repur-
chase of Common Shares, published in the Yale Law Journal in 1969 by 
then-Yale Law School professor Marvin A. Chirelstein.16 In that article, 
Chirelstein proposed a new income tax regime for buybacks that aimed to 
eliminate the buyback tax advantage.17 In brief: Chirelstein would treat the 
amount of the buyback as a cash dividend paid out to all shareholders on 
a pro rata basis, thus triggering dividend tax obligations for all taxpaying 
shareholders and capital gains or losses for those who choose to cash out 
their shares.18 By eliminating the tax advantage of buybacks over divi-
dends, Chirelstein’s proposal—which we explain in much more detail be-
low—would render buybacks a less attractive mechanism for returning 
capital to shareholders.  
Subsequent scholarship on the taxation of share repurchases has 
taken note of Chirelstein’s proposal but questioned its political feasibility. 
Professor Ethan Yale has emphasized the “public relations difficulty” cre-
ated by the fact that Chirelstein’s proposal would require shareholders who 
do not participate in the buyback to pay a dividend tax.19 Professor Bret 
Wells, though sympathetic to Chirelstein’s idea, has echoed the public-re-
lations concern.20 For most of its first half-century of life, Chirelstein’s pro-
posal looked like it was destined for the same fate as other tax policy ideas 
that appeal to wonkish professors and think-tank analysts but appear to be 
political nonstarters—a category that also might include the taxation of net 
imputed rent on owner-occupied homes,21 retrospective capital gains taxa-
tion,22 and the taxation of life insurance “buildup.”23 
The sudden surge in the volume of—and attention to—corporate 
share repurchases potentially alters the political calculus. As lawmakers 
and regulators search for policies that can stem the rising buyback tide, 
Chirelstein’s proposal may finally have its moment. Indeed, Senator Rubio 
included a citation to Chirelstein’s article in a recent report—though on 
                                                                                                                                             
 16. Marvin A. Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the 
Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739 (1969). 
 17. Id. at 751-55. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Ethan Yale, Corporate Distributions Tax Reform: Exploring the Alternatives, 29 
VA. TAX REV. 329, 353 (2009).   
 20. See Bret Wells, Reform of Corporate Distributions in Subchapter C, 37 VA. TAX 
REV. 365, 396 (2018) (citing Yale, supra note 19, at 353). 
 21. See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 84 (1990). 
 22. See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 
167 (1991).  
 23. Calvin H. Johnson, Andrew Pike & Eric A. Lustig, Tax on Insurance Buildup, 112 




page 74 and footnote 287 of a dense 78-page document,24 it was hardly a 
Warholian “fifteen minutes of fame.” Unlike some of the other anti-buy-
back proposals, Chirelstein’s scheme has the virtue of being intellectually 
defensible. And it would almost certainly raise revenue—in the ballpark of 
$70 billion to $80 billion a year in the near term25—making it a potentially 
attractive add-on to future budget bills that strive for revenue neutrality or 
deficit reduction.  
Yet the most persuasive reasons to adopt Chirelstein’s proposal have 
nearly nothing to do with the concerns of current buyback critics. The con-
tention that stock buybacks cannibalize long-term investment is doubtful 
at best; the claim that buybacks benefit corporate executives at the expense 
of other shareholders is not well-supported either.26 Nor is Chirelstein’s 
case for his own proposal particularly persuasive a half-century later. 
Chirelstein’s chief concern was that differential treatment of buybacks 
“distort[ed] the customary and intended pattern of taxation.”27 By now, 
though, differential treatment of buybacks and dividends is the custom, 
and it is hard to say that Congress—which has acquiesced to the status quo 
for decades—“intends” any other result. 
There are, however, a number of more powerful arguments in favor 
of Chirelstein’s idea—arguments absent from Chirelstein’s original article 
and largely overlooked in the current buyback debate. One argument re-
lates to the so-called “Mark Zuckerberg problem”28: the effective nontax-
ation of founders of phenomenally successful companies with zero-divi-
dend policies who hold their shares until death and benefit from a step-up 
in basis.29 A second pertains to the “Panama Papers problem”: the ability 
of foreign investors who hold stock in tax-haven jurisdictions to avoid U.S. 
tax—and potentially any tax—on U.S. equity gains. Chirelstein, to be sure, 
cannot be faulted for failing to consider these points. The rise of zero- and 
                                                                                                                                             
 24. Marco Rubio, Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry, U.S. 




 25. For our explanation on the basis for this revenue estimate, see infra notes 179-183, 
190 and accompanying text. We calculate a $74 billion yield based on revenue gains from foreign 
shareholders alone. 
 26. See infra Section III.A. 
 27. Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 756. 
 28. Edward D. Kleinbard, The Right Tax at the Right Time, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 208, 299 
(2017). 
 29. We find that the nontaxation of nonredeeming shareholders is especially problematic 
in the context of corporate founders because their gains are likely best characterized as a form of 
labor income, which ought to be taxed even under theories of optimal taxation that prescribe a 
zero rate on capital income. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of 
an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006). 
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low-dividend stocks largely postdated Chirelstein’s article,30 as did the 
growth in foreign ownership of U.S. equities.31 It is either a remarkable 
coincidence or an extraordinary testament to Chirelstein’s clairvoyance 
that the strongest reasons to adopt his proposal today arise from trends 
that took off well after he wrote. 
In short, while Chirelstein’s proposal has much to recommend it, the 
arguments in its favor are distinct from the arguments that Chirelstein of-
fered and from the anti-buyback arguments that make the proposal politi-
cally attractive. More than a half century after its inception, Chirelstein’s 
proposal has finally found both a purpose and a potential set of friends. 
This Article seeks to explain the modern-day virtues of Chirelstein’s pro-
posal as well as its plausible political appeal and possible pitfalls. 
Our analysis proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces the basics of 
buybacks, explains the difference in the tax treatment of buybacks and div-
idends, and traces the meteoric rise of buybacks in recent years. Part II 
presents Chirelstein’s proposal and discusses the major challenges that im-
plementation would entail. Part III evaluates the case for taxing buybacks 
like cash dividends. We find that the arguments for Chirelstein’s proposal 
based on the concerns of current buyback critics are weak, and Chirel-
stein’s own arguments do little to move the dial. However, a number of 
relatively recent developments in U.S. equity markets give rise to strong 
tax policy arguments in the proposal’s favor. Part IV ends with reflections 
on Chirelstein’s proposal in the context of broader changes to capital tax-
ation and trends in legal scholarship. 
I. The Basics of Buybacks 
A. Buybacks and Dividends as Alternative Mechanisms for Returning 
Capital to Shareholders 
When a corporation earns profits, it can reinvest those profits or dis-
tribute them to its shareholders.32 If it chooses to distribute the profits, the 
corporation can redeem (i.e., buy back) outstanding shares, or it can issue 
cash dividends. If it buys back shares, the number of outstanding shares 
shrinks, while if it issues cash dividends, the number of outstanding shares 
remains the same. Nevertheless, as tax lawyers understood well before 
Chirelstein’s 1969 article, the two transactions are “essentially 
                                                                                                                                             
 30. See S&P 500 Dividend Yield by Year, MULTIPL, https://www.multpl.com/s-p-500-
dividend-yield/table/by-year [https://perma.cc/B43R-X7QQ]. 
 31. See Summary of Report on Foreign Portfolio Investment in the United States, U.S. 
DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 31, 1997), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-cen-
ter/tic/Pages/shl94sum.aspx [https://perma.cc/9DXR-NCUJ]. 
 32. Note that a corporation need not earn profits in order to engage in buybacks or pay 




equivalent”—or, at least, can be.33 Two transactions—one denominated a 
buyback, the other characterized as a cash dividend—can achieve econom-
ically identical results both for the corporation and for its shareholders. 
To illustrate, consider the following two examples: 
 
Example 1. ChirelsteinCorp issues 100 shares for $1 each. A and B each 
buy 50 shares. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $100 in profits, which causes the 
value of each share to rise from $1 to $2 (assuming that market value equals 
book value). ChirelsteinCorp thereafter decides to distribute its $100 of 
earnings to its shareholders. ChirelsteinCorp does so by repurchasing 50 
shares. A chooses to redeem all 50 of her shares; B chooses not to redeem. 
The total cost of the buyback to ChirelsteinCorp is $100; A receives $100 
and B receives 0; and the value of each ChirelsteinCorp share remains $2. 
B now owns all 50 outstanding shares of ChirelsteinCorp, which is worth 
$100.  
 
Example 2. ChirelsteinCorp issues 100 shares for $1 each. A and B each 
buy 50 shares. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $100 in profits, which causes the 
value of each share to rise from $1 to $2 (assuming that market value equals 
book value). ChirelsteinCorp thereafter decides to distribute its $100 of 
earnings to its shareholders. ChirelsteinCorp does so by issuing a cash divi-
dend of $1 per share, causing the value of each share to fall from $2 back to 
$1. Afterwards, B uses the $50 she has received through the cash dividend 
to purchase A’s 50 shares. B now owns all 100 outstanding shares of Chirel-
steinCorp, which is worth $100. 
 
Aside from the tax consequences, to which we will turn in a moment, 
the only practical differences between Example 1 (the buyback) and Ex-
ample 2 (the cash dividend) are cosmetic. Either way, ChirelsteinCorp dis-
tributes $100 to shareholders. Either way, A ends up with $100 of cash, and 
B ends up owning all of ChirelsteinCorp, which has total equity of $100. 
The only difference is that in Example 1, B ends up with 50 shares worth 
$2 each, while in Example 2, B ends up with 100 shares worth $1 each. But 
no one is richer or poorer (pre-tax) in one example than in another, and 
no one has a larger or smaller stake in ChirelsteinCorp. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
 33. Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 739. 
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Table 1. Economic Consequences of Buybacks vs. Dividends 
 A B 
Example 1 
Initial Holdings 50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
After Corp Earns $100 
Profits 
50 shares x $2 50 shares x $2 
$100 Buyback -50 shares x $2 0 
Final Holdings 0 50 shares x $2 
Example 2 
Initial Holdings 50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
After Corp Earns $100 
Profits 
50 shares x $2 50 shares x $2 
$100 Dividend 50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
Holdings 
Post-Dividend 
50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
Post-Dividend  
Purchase/Sale 
-50 shares x $1 +50 shares x $1 
Final Holdings 0 100 shares x $1 
 
Notwithstanding the economic equivalence, though, Example 1 (buy-
back) leads to very different tax consequences than Example 2 (cash divi-
dends). But before delving into the tax treatment of buybacks and divi-
dends, it is worth pausing to consider the nontax reasons why a firm might 
choose one method or the other to distribute earnings to shareholders. 
First, a company may have genuine nontax reasons for wanting its 
share price to remain above a certain threshold—for example, because a 
particular stock exchange will delist a company’s shares if they fall below 
a particular price.34 But the minimum share price for the New York Stock 
Exchange and Nasdaq is $1,35 so this factor cannot explain the buyback 
decisions of firms whose share prices are comfortably above that floor.  
 A second nontax reason for corporations to choose buybacks over 
cash dividends results from the interaction between corporate distributions 
and employee stock options. To illustrate: imagine that ChirelsteinCorp 
hires a manager and offers her—as part of her pay package—call options 
                                                                                                                                             
 34. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Maureen O’Hara & David Pompilio, Down and Out in 
the Stock Market: The Law and Economics of the Delisting Process, 51 J.L. & ECON. 683, 687-88 
(2008). 
 35. See Bob Haring, The Minimum Stock Price for NYSE, ZACKS, https://fi-
nance.zacks.com/minimum-stock-price-nyse-5116.html [https://perma.cc/JW7A-JA7B]; Tiffany 





on ChirelsteinCorp stock with a strike price of $1.10 per share.36 If Chirel-
steinCorp distributes earnings to shareholders via a buyback, then the 
share price remains at $2, and the manager’s call options are “in the 
money” (i.e., the share price is higher than the strike price). If Chirelstein-
Corp distributes earnings to shareholders via a dividend, then the share 
price falls back to $1, and the manager’s call options are “out of the 
money.” Insofar as managers with stock options have influence over the 
choice between buybacks and dividends, they will generally prefer buy-
backs.37 
Third, corporations may choose buybacks over cash dividends for 
nontax reasons if managers believe the firm’s shares are undervalued.38 Re-
call that a buyback is the equivalent of a cash dividend followed by a pur-
chase of shares by nonredeeming shareholders from redeeming sharehold-
ers. If managers who own shares in the company believe that the shares are 
undervalued, and if the managers do not redeem their own shares in the 
buyback, then the buyback effectively allows the managers to purchase 
shares at what they believe to be a bargain price.  
Finally, corporations may choose buybacks over cash dividends to de-
fend against hostile takeovers. Unlike a cash dividend, a buyback increases 
the ownership percentage of nonredeeming shareholders. Managers who 
hold minority interests in a corporation may initiate a buyback—but not 
redeem any of their own shares—in order to increase their ownership stake 
and thus reduce the probability that a hostile tender offer will succeed.39 
But again, managers can accomplish the same result by issuing cash divi-
dends and then using their dividends to buy shares, so buybacks are not the 
only way for managers to increase their percentage holdings.40 
Many of the nontax reasons for choosing a dividend over a buyback 
are symmetrical to the above-listed reasons for choosing a buyback over a 
                                                                                                                                             
 36. A call option is an option that entitles the holder to purchase the underlying asset for 
the strike price on or before a certain time. 
 37. See Richard A. Lambert, William N. Lanen & David F. Larcker, Executive Stock 
Option Plans and Corporate Dividend Policy, 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 409 (1989). 
Prior to the enactment of section 409A, a few companies compensated managers with “dividend-
protected” stock options that aimed to offset the effect of dividends on option value, but dividend-
protected stock options were rare among U.S. firms. See Marckus C. Arnold & Robert M. Gillen-
kirch, Stock Options and Dividend Protection, 161 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 
453, 453-54 (2005).  Section 409A, which became effective in 2005, now effectively imposes severe 
penalties on firms that incorporate dividend-protection provisions in compensatory stock options. 
See infra Section I.C. 
 38. See, e.g., Theo Vermaelen, Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signaling: An 
Empirical Study, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 139 (1981). 
 39. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1377, 1393 (1986). 
 40. Arguably, buybacks solve a collective action problem among managers, who other-
wise would have to agree on how many shares each one should purchase on the open market (with 
potential incentives to freeride). However, a similar collective action problem exists with buybacks 
if managers are free to redeem shares themselves. 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:246 2021 
256 
dividend. First, a company may have nontax reasons for wanting its share 
price to fall. At some point, very high share prices become cumbersome 
for investors—a case in point being Berkshire Hathaway’s Class A shares, 
which traded at over $320,000 per share as of this writing.41 Yet, this expla-
nation likely applies to only a few phenomenally successful companies 
whose share prices rise so much as to become unwieldy.42 And even in 
those cases, a company can reduce its share price through a stock split. 
Second, a company may choose cash dividends over buybacks precisely be-
cause the individuals making the distribution decision do not want to ben-
efit managers with stock options. Third, a corporation may choose cash 
dividends over buybacks if managers think that shares are overvalued. If 
other shareholders—but not the managers—are enrolled in “dividend re-
investment plans” (DRIPs) that automatically use dividends to buy new 
shares, then issuing dividends allows managers to reduce their stake in the 
corporation.43 
Several other shareholder-side reasons explain a possible preference 
for cash dividends over buybacks. First, some mutual funds and other in-
stitutional investors are required to maintain a certain percentage of divi-
dend-paying securities in their portfolios.44 This helps to explain why some 
companies, such as General Electric, have chosen to pay a dividend of one 
penny per share rather than eliminating dividends entirely.45 Concededly, 
this explanation for cash dividends is incomplete, as it still leaves the ques-
tion as to why a mutual fund or other institutional investor would commit 
itself to holding dividend-paying securities—a question to which path de-
pendency may be the only answer. 
Second, some trusts and endowments are structured such that the “in-
come” and “principal” are treated differently. For example, an endow-
ment’s terms may stipulate that the income—including dividends—can be 
                                                                                                                                             
 41. See Berkshire Hathaway Inc BRK.A, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, 
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:BRK.A [https://perma.cc/2TBE-8K3H]. 
 42. See Matt Levine, Who Cares What Apple’s Stock Price Is?, BLOOMBERG OPINION 
(Apr. 25, 2014, 1:49 PM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-04-25/who-
cares-what-apple-s-stock-price-is [https://perma.cc/JFQ7-ELGG]. 
 43. Once again, managers can achieve much the same outcome by selling some of their 
own shares on the open market. An advantage of pursuing this outcome through dividends rather 
than sales is that companies’ insider-trading policies often do not apply to participation or non-
participation in a DRIP. See, e.g., BlackRock, Inc., Personal Trading Policy (Apr. 4, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1100663/000119312514241353/d745741dex99p2.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5DVJ-KLBA] (exempting dividend-reinvestment plans from preclearance re-
quirement in Section 5). 
 44. See, e.g., BlackRock, Inc., BlackRock Equity Dividend Fund: Class K Shares (Sum-
mary Prospectus) (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814507/ 
000119312518343088/d647539d497k.htm [https://perma.cc/HX5T-CGET]. 
 45. See, e.g., Michael Sheetz, GE Makes It Official, Lowers Dividend to a Penny, CNBC 





spent each year, while the principal—including capital appreciation—can-
not be. A charitable institution may therefore have an incentive to invest 
endowment assets in dividend-paying securities in order to generate usable 
income.46 Anecdotally, though, we know of very few major institutional 
investors still subject to restrictions of this sort. 
Third, some investors (e.g., retirees living off their savings) may have 
a preference for liquidity that cash dividends satisfy. But in an era in which 
major brokerages will conduct commission-free trades,47 it is relatively 
easy for these same investors to generate “homemade dividends” by selling 
their shares when they desire liquidity. Moreover, while companies that 
distribute earnings through buybacks rather than dividends impose trans-
action costs on shareholders with a preference for liquidity, companies that 
distribute earnings through cash dividends rather than buybacks impose 
transaction costs on shareholders with a preference for reinvesting those 
dividends.48 Still, cash dividends potentially allow retail investors to access 
liquidity without the “regret” that may come from selling shares of a stock 
whose price then rises—which the behavioral economics literature sug-
gests may be a benefit.49 
All of this is to say that there are plausible—but, for the most part, 
not powerful—reasons why some managers and shareholders may prefer 
buybacks over cash dividends or vice versa. As a general rule, and setting 
tax considerations aside, managers and shareholders can achieve equiva-
lent pretax economic outcomes through either approach. As the next Sec-
tion explains, however, tax rules upset the near-equivalence in significant 
ways. 
B. A Primer on the Taxation of Buybacks and Dividends 
The taxation of buybacks and dividends is a story of clienteles. By 
“clienteles,” we refer to different groups of taxpayers across whom the tax 
treatment of buybacks and dividends varies starkly.50 For some clienteles, 
                                                                                                                                             
 46. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends to Capital 
Gain and Debt Investments to Equity—A Daunting Principal and Income Problem, 32 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 255 (1997). 
 47. See, e.g., Commissions, Margin Rates, and Fees, FIDELITY INV., https://www.fidel-
ity.com/trading/commissions-margin-rates [https://perma.cc/HP8N-G6MJ]. 
 48. Some, but not all, companies offer “no-fee” dividend reinvestment plans. See, e.g., 
No-Fee DRIPs, DIRECTINVESTING.COM, https://www.directinvesting.com/search/ 
no_fees_list.cfm [https://perma.cc/W6T3-4NE6]. Note, though, that “no-fee” dividend-reinvest-
ment plans simply shift the transaction costs associated with dividend reinvestment from the share-
holder to the corporation. 
 49. For a regret-aversion theory of cash dividend preferences, see Hersh M. Shefrin & 
Meir Statman, Explaining Investor Preference for Cash Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 268-71 
(1984). 
 50. See Franklin Allen, Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivan Welch, A Theory of Dividends 
Based on Tax Clienteles, 55 J. FIN. 2499 (2000). 
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the tax treatment of buybacks is more favorable than the tax treatment of 
dividends. For others, it is the reverse. Still others are indifferent to the 
form in which corporations distribute earnings to shareholders. We con-
sider the perspectives of U.S. individuals, foreigners, U.S. corporations, 
and tax-exempt investors. 
1. U.S. Individuals 
We start with individual U.S. citizens and residents who hold stock in 
taxable accounts. These individual taxpayers generally fare better when 
corporations distribute earnings through buybacks rather than dividends. 
Under section 302,51 a buyback is generally treated as the disposition of a 
capital asset, and only the amount realized over the taxpayer’s basis is in-
cluded in gross income. By contrast, the entire amount of a dividend is in-
cluded in gross income. Prior to 2003, dividends were treated as ordinary 
income, which for individuals was taxed at a higher rate than long-term 
capital gains.52 Since 2003, income from dividends paid by domestic corpo-
rations and certain foreign corporations has been classified as “qualified 
dividend income,” which for individuals has been taxed at the same rate as 
long-term capital gains.53 But despite the post-2003 rate equivalence, dif-
ferent rules regarding realization and basis for buybacks and dividends 
have preserved the tax advantage of the former for U.S. individuals. 
To illustrate: consider again Example 1 above, in which Chirelstein-
Corp buys back 50 shares from A at a price of $2 per share. The buyback 
is a realization event for A, and A has a capital gain equal to the amount 
realized ($100) minus her cost basis ($50), or $50. If A has held her Chirel-
steinCorp shares for more than a year, the gain will be taxed at the long-
term capital-gain rate, which—for taxpayers in the highest income tax 
bracket—is currently 20%.54 The buyback from A would not be a realiza-
tion event for B, so B would pay no tax on the transaction. 
Now consider Example 2, in which ChirelsteinCorp issues a cash div-
idend of $1 per share and B then uses her cash dividend to buy A’s shares. 
Assuming again that the qualified-dividend provision applies, A and B 
would each pay tax at the long-term capital-gain rate on their $50 of qual-
ified dividend income. If both are in the top bracket, the tax for each one 
is 20% times $50, or $10. If B then buys A’s shares, A would experience a 
                                                                                                                                             
 51. I.R.C. § 302 (2018). 
 52. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 23 (Comm. Print 2005), 
http://www.jct.gov/s-5-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KJX-DBW3]; David Hunkar, U.S. Dividends and 
Capital Gains Tax Rate Since 1961, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 7, 2011), https://seekingalpha.com/ar-
ticle/285468-u-s-dividends-and-the-capital-gains-tax-rate-since-1961 [https://perma.cc/3Z3K-
AY59].  
 53. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 
§ 302(a), 117 Stat. 752, 760-61 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018)). 
 54. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018). 
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realization event—though in this example, the sale price ($1 per share) is 
equal to A’s purchase price, so no capital-gain tax is owed. 
In Example 1 (buyback), the total tax paid by A is $10. In Example 2 
(dividend), the total tax is $20 (i.e., $10 for each one). To be sure, the buy-
back approach does not necessarily eliminate tax liability—rather, it defers 
tax liability. In Example 1, B is left with 50 shares of ChirelsteinCorp stock, 
which she purchased for $50 and which are now worth $100. When she 
sells—assuming the long-term capital-gain rate remains the same—she will 
owe a tax of $10. In Example 2, B is left with 100 shares of ChirelsteinCorp 
stock and basis of $100, so she will owe no tax at the time of sale unless 
ChirelsteinCorp’s share price rises in the future. Thus, either way (and with 
caveats soon to follow), B will ultimately pay $10 of tax; the difference be-
tween the buyback approach and the dividend approach is that with the 
buyback approach, she pays the $10 later, while with the dividend ap-
proach, she pays the $10 now. 
Deferring the $10 tax liability is potentially a benefit to B if the nom-
inal interest rate is greater than zero (as it generally is). Note that this de-
ferral benefit arises even if B redeems some but not all of her shares in the 
buyback. The reason is that when B redeems some of her shares, she pays 
capital gains tax on the amount realized minus basis, while when she re-
ceives a dividend, the entire amount of the dividend is included in income. 
So in Example 1, if B had redeemed one share of ChirelsteinCorp stock at 
a price of $2, she would have paid capital gains tax on $1 (i.e., the amount 
realized minus her basis of $1 per share), while if she had received a $2 
dividend, the entire dividend would have been taxable immediately. 
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Table 2. Tax Consequences of Buybacks vs. Dividends 
 A B 
Example 1 
Initial Holdings 50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
After Corp Earns $100 
Profits 
50 shares x $2 50 shares x $2 
$100 Buyback -50 shares x $2 — 
Final Holdings 0 50 shares x $2 
Taxable Dividends $0 $0 
     Tax at 20% rate $0 $0 
Taxable Capital Gains 50 shares x ($2 - $1) = 
$50 
0 
     Tax at 20% rate $50 x 20% = $10 $0 
Unrealized Capital 
Gains 
$0 50 shares x ($2 - $1) 
= $50 
Example 2 
Initial Holdings 50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
After Corp Earns $100 
Profits 
50 shares x $2 50 shares x $2 
$100 Dividend 50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
Holdings  
Post-Dividend 
50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
Post-Dividend  
Purchase/Sale 
-50 shares x $1 +50 shares x $1 
Final Holdings 0 100 shares x $1 
Taxable Dividends $50 $50 
     Tax at 20% rate $50 x 20% = $10 $50 x 20% = $10 
Taxable Capital Gains 50 shares x ($1 - $1) = 
$0 
0 
     Tax at 20% rate $0 $0 
Unrealized  
Capital Gains 
$0 100 shares x ($1 - 
$1) = $0 
 
The benefit of deferral is not, however, the only potential tax benefit 
of the buyback approach. Most significantly, the step-up in basis at death55 
means that if B holds her shares for the rest of her life and bequeaths them 
to her children or other heirs, she can avoid tax on her $50 capital gain 
entirely. As we discuss below, this rule, with an assist from the tax law’s 
treatment of buybacks, results in what the late Edward Kleinbard memo-
rably called “the Mark Zuckerberg problem.”56 The problem, in brief, is 
                                                                                                                                             
 55. See id. § 1014. 
 56. Kleinbard, supra note 28, at 299. 
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that current law allows founders of successful companies to amass and con-
sume tremendous fortunes without paying any tax on those gains.  They do 
this by acquiring stock when their companies are initially formed (often 
literally for pennies) and then by holding that stock until they die, at which 
point their heirs can sell their shares without any income tax due to the 
stepped-up basis rule.  In the meantime, the corporation can distribute 
earnings to the shareholders via buybacks, and the founders will face no 
tax liability as long as they do not redeem their shares. We discuss the Mark 
Zuckerberg problem further in Section III.D.  
The buyback approach—which allows B to avoid immediate taxation 
of dividends and instead hold stock with unrealized gains—confers benefits 
on B even if she does not hold her stock until death and benefit from the 
step-up in basis. If B ultimately contributes her ChirelsteinCorp shares to 
charity, she can avoid tax on her capital gain as well. Better yet, if B has 
held her shares for more than a year, she can claim a charitable contribu-
tion deduction for the fair market value of those shares, including the un-
taxed appreciation.57 Even if B does not hold her shares until death or do-
nate them to charity, she can time her sale of ChirelsteinCorp stock for a 
year in which she is in a lower bracket. And if B has capital losses that 
would otherwise go unused, she can use them to soak up the $50 capital 
gain. Because capital losses generally can be used to offset capital gains but 
not dividend income,58 this is an additional advantage of the buyback ap-
proach. 
Before leaving behind the tax treatment of individuals, one final point 
merits mention: section 302 of the Code, which governs the tax treatment 
of buybacks, provides that a corporation’s redemption (i.e., repurchase) of 
its own shares will be treated as a payment in exchange for stock—and not 
as a cash dividend—“if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a 
dividend.”59  The Supreme Court has held that a redemption is not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend if it results “in a meaningful reduction of the 
shareholder’s proportionate interest in the corporation.”60  For repur-
chases by public companies, which are the focus of this Article, the IRS 
generously has determined that any reduction in percentage ownership in-
terest by a non-controlling shareholder qualifies as a meaningful reduc-
tion.61 As a practical matter, this means that repurchases by public 
                                                                                                                                             
 57. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A). 
 58. See id. § 1211(b).  For individual taxpayers, net capital losses can offset ordinary in-
come to the extent of $3,000 per year. 
 59. Id. § 302(a)-(b)(1). 
 60. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970).  
 61. Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92 (ruling that where a redeeming shareholder goes 
from a .00011118% interest in the corporation to a .0001081% interest, the redemption is not es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend because “the redemption involves a minority shareholder whose 
relative stock interest . . . is minimal and who exercises no control over the affairs of [the 
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corporations will almost always be treated as buybacks giving rise to capital 
gains (or losses) rather than as dividends.62 
For nonpublic companies, the legal regime is rather more compli-
cated. Any transaction in which a shareholder redeems (i.e., sells back) all 
of her stock will automatically be treated as a repurchase.63 Thus, in Exam-
ple 1, where A sold back all of her shares, the transaction would clearly 
qualify as a buyback rather than a dividend.64 Likewise, a transaction is 
automatically treated as repurchase—and not as a dividend—if a share-
holder reduces her voting and total interest by more than one fifth (e.g., 
from 10% to less than 8%) and ends up with less than 50% of the voting 
power in the company.65 
For transactions that do not trigger automatic buyback treatment, the 
Supreme Court’s meaningful-reduction test must be applied. In the context 
of closely held corporations, the test is a facts-and-circumstance standard. 
For example, in a 1975 IRS revenue ruling, a reduction of a shareholder’s 
interest from 57% of a corporation’s common stock to 50% qualified as a 
meaningful reduction when there was only one other shareholder because 
the redeeming shareholder went from having full control of the corpora-
tion to being positioned in a deadlock situation. The redemption therefore 
was treated as a sale and not a dividend.66 A revenue ruling the following 
year reached the same result where the redeemed shareholder’s interest 
was reduced from 27% to 22.27%. The IRS reasoned that—in light of the 
ownership percentages of other shareholders in the same corporation—the 
transaction meant that the taxpayer would now need the support of two 
                                                                                                                                             
corporation, and] as a result of the redemption, [the shareholder] experienced a reduction of its 
voting rights, its right to participate in current earnings and accumulated surplus, and its right to 
share in net assets on liquidation”).  
 62. One exception would be where the redeeming shareholder has a sufficiently large 
post-redemption interest in the public company to allow her to continue to exercise some degree 
of practical control over the corporation. Another exception would be where the redeeming share-
holder sold a smaller percentage of her shares than the percentage reduction of outstanding shares 
as a result of all of redemptions pursuant to the plan of redemption.  For example, if a corporation 
with 100,000,000 shares outstanding redeems 5,000,000 shares, any shareholder who redeems 
shares totaling 5% or less of her shares would not qualify. Consider a shareholder who owns 5,000 
shares before the redemption and who redeems 250 shares. Her percentage ownership would be 
unchanged: from 5,000/100,000,000 (0.005%) to 4,750/95,000,000 (0.005%). Accordingly, the re-
demption would be treated as a dividend, see I.R.C. § 302(a), and the basis of the redeemed shares 
would be shifted over to the shareholder’s remaining shares. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (2007) 
(requiring “proper adjustment of the basis of the remaining stock” where the redemption is 
treated as a dividend). 
 63. I.R.C. § 302(b)(3).   
 64. Technically, this qualifies under a safe harbor that provides for sale treatment when 
there is a complete termination. See id. A similar safe harbor applies in the case of substantially 
disproportionate redemptions, which are determined by mathematical formulas. See id. § 
302(b)(2). 
 65. Id. § 302(b)(2)(A). 




other shareholders in order to constitute a majority (whereas she previ-
ously could have done so with only one other).67  
While U.S. individuals who hold stock in taxable accounts have a tax 
incentive to prefer buybacks over dividends, those investors account for a 
relatively small fraction of all U.S. corporation stockholdings. According 
to a recent estimate by researchers at the Tax Policy Center, only around 
25% of outstanding C corporation stock is held directly or indirectly by 
U.S. households in taxable accounts.68 Another 40% is held by foreign res-
idents, making it especially important to consider the way that U.S. and 
foreign tax rules affect those investors’ preferences for buybacks versus 
dividends.69 
2. Foreigners 
For foreign investors—nonresident aliens and foreign corporations—
the rules are different, but the result is generally the same: the U.S. federal 
income-tax treatment of buybacks is more generous than the tax treatment 
of dividends.70 
The United States generally does not tax nonresident aliens and for-
eign corporations on capital gains from the sale of U.S. securities.71 Thus, 
for those investors, buybacks are effectively U.S. tax-free. The United 
States does, however, tax dividends paid by U.S. corporations to nonresi-
dent aliens and foreign corporations. For those investors, the standard tax 
rate on dividends is 30%, and the dividend tax is withheld at the source by 
the issuing corporation.72 Tax treaties often reduce this 30% rate to 15% 
(or 5% where the shareholder owns more than 10% of the issuing 
                                                                                                                                             
 67. Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91. 
 68. Steve Rosenthal & Theo Burke, Who’s Left to Tax? US Taxation of Corporations 




 69. See id.  
 70. See Stanley Veliotis, Equating U.S. Tax Treatment of Dividends and Capital Gains 
for Foreign Portfolio Investors, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 345 (2019) (noting the buyback advantage and 
mentioning Chirelstein’s article in passing, though not explaining how Chirelstein’s proposal 
would address the buyback advantage). 
 71. See I.R.C. § 865(a) (2018) (providing that personal property sales of foreigners are 
subject to various exceptions not relevant to stock sales, sourced outside the United States); id. § 
871 (taxing foreign individuals who are not engaged in a trade or business in the United States 
only on their United States source of income); id. § 881 (same for foreign corporations). 
 72. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (taxing dividends received by foreign individuals); id. § 
881(a)(1)(A) (taxing dividends received by foreign corporations); id. § 1441 (imposing withhold-
ing tax on dividends received by foreign individuals); id. § 1442 (imposing withholding tax on div-
idends received by foreign corporations).   
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corporation’s shares), but none of the United States’ tax treaties provide 
for the total exemption of dividends.73 
Often, a foreign investor’s home jurisdiction will allow the foreign in-
vestor to credit U.S. taxes against her home jurisdiction tax liability. Even 
so, the home jurisdiction’s own tax rules will often reproduce the buyback 
tax advantage. Although many countries nominally tax capital gains and 
dividends paid to residents at the same rate, some of the same factors that 
make buybacks more attractive to U.S. individual shareholders make them 
more attractive to foreign shareholders as well. Shareholders who do not 
sell their stock in a buyback can defer or strategically time their ultimate 
sale, so investors in those countries will have a tax preference for buybacks 
over dividends.74 
Current law’s treatment of foreign shareholders contributes to what 
we call “the Panama Papers problem”: the ability of high-net-worth indi-
viduals from around the world to accumulate significant gains from U.S. 
equity investments without paying any tax anywhere. They can do this by 
purchasing shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq via 
entities in tax-haven jurisdictions. While the U.S. imposes a withholding 
tax of up to 30% on dividends, no or little withholding tax is due if investors 
buy no- or low-dividend-yield stocks that return all or most of their earn-
ings to shareholders via buybacks. As a result, these stocks offer an attrac-
tive place for tax dodgers to park their cash.  We discuss the Panama Pa-
pers problem in Section III.E below. 
3. U.S. Corporations 
Domestic corporations that hold stock in other domestic corporations 
constitute a meaningful—though modest—share of the U.S. stockholding 
base. Intercorporate equity holdings account for about 6% of total U.S. 
public equity outstanding, according to a Tax Policy Center analysis of 
Federal Reserve data.75 For these shareholders, the tax preference for buy-
backs is potentially reversed.  For domestic corporations, dividends and 
capital gains are both taxed at the ordinary corporate rate, which is cur-
rently 21%. However, these corporations also generally receive a dividend-
received deduction equal to 50% of the dividend.76 The upshot is that 
                                                                                                                                             
 73. See Table 1. Tax Rates on Income Other Than Personal Service Income Under 
Chapter 3, Internal Revenue Code, and Income Tax Treaties, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Feb. 
2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/Tax_Treaty_Table_1_2019_Feb.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3L3-
WYKB]. 
 74. See Marcus Jacob & Martin Jacob, Taxation, Dividends, and Share Repurchases: 
Taking Evidence Global, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1241, 1249-1250 & tbl.2 (2013). 
 75. See Rosenthal & Burke, supra note 68, at 12 tbl.1. 
 76. See I.R.C. § 243. The deduction is 100% for dividends received by corporations who 




dividends received by corporations are typically taxed at an effective rate 
of 10.5%—half the rate on capital gains. 
The lower effective tax rate on dividends than on capital gains may 
suggest that domestic corporations that hold shares in other corporations 
have a straightforward tax incentive to prefer dividends over buybacks. In 
fact, the incentives facing domestic corporations are more complicated. 
First, domestic corporations potentially experience a tradeoff between the 
deferral benefit of buybacks and the benefit of the lower effective rate for 
dividends.77 Second, corporations—like individuals—can use capital losses 
to offset capital gains but not dividends. Thus, a corporation with signifi-
cant unused capital losses may prefer to receive distributions via buyback 
rather than cash dividend.78 Depending on the particular circumstances of 
the domestic corporation (including the length of time for which it plans to 
hold shares and the extent of its unused capital losses), the tax benefits of 
cash dividends may outweigh the benefits of buybacks or vice versa.79 
4. Tax-Exempt Investors 
Finally, note that a significant portion of U.S. corporate stock is held 
by investors who have no tax preference for buybacks versus cash divi-
dends. According to Tax Policy Center estimates, tax-exempt or tax-indif-
ferent investors—including pension plans, individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs), governmental and nonprofit institutions, and life insurers—held 
around 37% of all U.S. corporate equity in 2019.80 Distributions to pension-
plan participants and IRA holders are taxed the same way regardless of 
whether they are funded from capital gains or cash dividends, so these 
shareholders are (at least for tax purposes) indifferent between buybacks 
and dividends. Meanwhile, investment income of nonprofit institutions is 
                                                                                                                                             
 77. Recall that the deferral benefit arises because repurchases allow immediate use of 
basis to offset proceeds, while dividends do not.  This earlier use of basis results in tax deferral.  
Deferral is less valuable in the context of corporations in part because they do not have the po-
tential for a stepped-up basis at death.  Dealers in securities must calculate tax on a mark-to-mar-
ket basis, effectively eliminating the tax benefit of deferral. See id. § 475(a). 
 78. The problem of unused capital losses is often more acute for corporations than indi-
viduals. While individuals may carry forward unused capital losses until they die, corporations may 
carry back capital losses to the three prior taxable years or carry them forward for only five years. 
Compare id. § 1212(b) (allowing unlimited carrying forward for individuals), with id. § 1212(a) 
(allowing a three-year carryback and five-year carryforward for corporations).   
 79. For a high-profile example of firms structuring a redemption as a dividend rather 
than a buyback in order to achieve more favorable tax treatment, see Merle M. Erickson & Shiing-
wu Wang, Exploiting and Sharing Tax Benefits: Seagram and DuPont, 21 J. AM. TAX ASS’N, no. 
2, 1999, at 35. In that case, Seagrams potentially saved $1.5 billion or more by structuring its re-
demption of DuPont shares as a dividend. See id. at 41 tbl.1.  
 80. See Rosenthal & Burke, supra note 68, at 14 tbl.4. Rosenthal and Burke’s estimates—
24% of U.S. equities held by taxable domestic investors, 40% by foreigners, 37% by tax-exempt 
or tax-indifferent investors—do not add to 100% due to rounding. For these purposes, intercor-
porate holdings are traced back to their ultimate owners. 
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generally taxed very lightly or not at all,81 and life insurers effectively pay 
no tax on investment income on their reserves,82 so these shareholders have 
few tax-related reasons to prefer buybacks over dividends or vice versa. 
All of this serves to illustrate that the conventional wisdom that buy-
backs are tax-advantaged relative to dividends amounts to an oversimpli-
fication. Foreign investors and U.S.-resident taxable individuals will gen-
erally prefer buybacks to dividends, but U.S. corporations that hold stock 
in other companies will not always share that preference, and a large seg-
ment of the shareholding population will be indifferent between the two 
forms of corporate cash distributions. As we discuss in Part III, these vari-
ous positions will have important implications for buyback tax policy. 
 
Table 3. U.S. Federal Income Tax Treatment of Buybacks and  
Dividends 
Investor Type Buybacks Dividends 
U.S. individuals (tax-
able accounts) 
—Top rate on long-
term capital gain = 
23.8% 
—Deferral advantage 
(early basis recovery) 
—Capital losses can be 
used to offset 




—Top rate on quali-





not be used to offset 
Foreign investors —No U.S. tax (possi-
bly home-country tax 
consequences) 
—U.S. withholding 
tax at rate of ≤ 30% 
U.S. corporations —Rate = 21% 
—Deferral advantage 
(early basis recovery) 
—Capital losses can be 
used to offset 








                                                                                                                                             
 81. Private foundations pay a tax of 1 to 2% on net investment income. See I.R.C. § 4940 
(2018). Starting in 2018, private colleges and universities with endowment assets of $500,000 per 
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C. The Fall of Dividends and the Rise of Buybacks 
Around the time that Chirelstein wrote his landmark article, cash div-
idends still were the dominant form of corporate distribution in the United 
States. Gross buybacks by U.S. corporations remained less than 10% of 
aggregate cash distributions until 1979, rising to approximately 12% by 
1980, 29% by 1990, and 53% by 2000.83 By the third quarter of 2019, ap-
proximately 61% of cash distributions by S&P 500 firms came in the form 
of buybacks (with the remainder in dividends).84 Commentators now rou-
tinely refer to this recent period as a “buyback boom.”85 
What explains the rise of buybacks relative to cash dividends? At least 
three factors potentially contributed to the trend. 
First, in November 1982, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) promulgated Rule 10b-18 under the Exchange Act of 1934, which 
provides issuers with a limited safe harbor from liability for market manip-
ulation when they buy back their shares.86 Importantly, the Rule 10b-18 
safe harbor applies to liability “solely by reason of the manner, timing, 
price, and volume” of repurchases;87 it does not affect liability for insider 
trading when the corporation possesses material, nonpublic information 
concerning the value of its securities.88 Still, the SEC rule is widely credited 
with reducing regulatory uncertainty surrounding buybacks,89 and it ap-
pears to be associated with a sharp rise in buybacks as a percentage of cor-
porate cash distributions over the course of the 1980s. 
Second, starting in the 1980s, stock option grants became an increas-
ingly large component of compensation for executives and other employ-
ees. Whereas stock-option grants constituted only around 14% of direct 
compensation for CEOs at the largest publicly traded U.S. companies in 
                                                                                                                                             
 83. Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substi-
tution Hypothesis, 57 J. FIN. 1649, 1655 tbl.1 (2002) (dividing the “REPO” column by the sum of 
the “REPO” + “DIV” columns). 
 84. Edward Yardeni, Joe Abbott & Mali Quintana, Corporate Finance Briefing: S&P 
500 Buybacks & Dividends, YADENI RES., INC. 9 fig.11 (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://www.yardeni.com/pub/bbdivepsyield.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FTY-KNNZ]. 
 85. See, e.g., Andrew Barry, Why the Buyback Boom Is Bullish for Investors, BARRON’S 
(May 12, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-the-buyback-boom-is-bullish-for-investors-
1526089472. 
 86. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-18 (2005). 
 87. Id. n.1. 
 88. Div. Trading & Mkts., Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Rule 
10b-18 (“Safe Harbor” for Issuer Repurchases), U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 2, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/r10b18faq0504.htm [https://perma.cc/A8S8-
YTLT]. 
 89. On the history of Rule 10b-18, see Douglas O. Cook, Laurie Krigman & J. Chris 
Leach, An Analysis of SEC Guidelines for Executing Open Market Repurchases, 76 J. BUS. 289, 
292-93 (2003). 
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1980, that figure had risen to 48% by 1994.90 Several factors account for 
this phenomenon. Pressure from potential acquirers during the hostile 
takeover boom of the 1980s encouraged corporations to adopt compensa-
tion arrangements that linked executive pay to share price.91 Academic re-
searchers who advocated for equity-based compensation in the 1980s and 
early 1990s also arguably played a role.92 Then in 1993, Congress added 
section 162(m) to the Internal Revenue Code, which limited the ability of 
corporations to claim deductions for compensation to senior executives in 
excess of $1 million unless those pay packages were performance-based.93 
Stock options were one type of performance-based compensation to which 
corporations turned so that they could pay their top executives more than 
$1 million and still deduct the full cost.94 The December 2017 tax law ended 
the exception for performance-based pay.95 
To be sure, these developments do not explain why stock options, as 
opposed to alternative forms of incentive-based pay, became predominant. 
The preference for stock options in particular was likely largely a function 
of financial accounting standards. A 1972 accounting rule instructed cor-
porations not to treat compensatory stock-option grants as expenses unless 
the strike price was lower than the company’s share price at the time.96 The 
effect of that rule was that corporations could compensate executives and 
employees in valuable stock options that did not immediately reduce the 
firms’ reported profitability. The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
                                                                                                                                             
 90. See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid like Bureaucrats?, 
113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 661 tbl.IIa (1998). 
 91. See Amanda Bennett, A Great Leap Forward for Executive Pay: Stock Options Pro-
pelled Gains by CEOs in ’88, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 24, 1989), 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/135406875 [https://perma.cc/724D-LH4Z]. 
 92. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How 
We Got Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 35 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Negotiation, 
Orgs. & Mkts Unit, Working Paper No. 44, 2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=561305 
[https://perma.cc/X6BM-T6Y3] (citing Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives: 
It's Not How Much You Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138; Michael C. 
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225 (1990)). 
 93. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 Stat. 
312, 435, 470-71 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m) (2018)). 
 94. See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from 
Executive Compensation, 108 J. POL. ECON. 352, 368 (2000). 
 95. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13601(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2155-56 (2017) (amending I.R.C. § 
162(m)). 
 96. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. 




changed that rule in 2004, with the change taking effect in 2006.97 Since 
then, stock-option grants to top executives have declined significantly.98 
The rise of stock-option grants between the early 1980s and the mid-
2000s helps to explain the increase in buybacks over that period. This is 
because stock-option grants generally are not “dividend-protected.” Re-
call that in Example 2 above, the decision to distribute earnings to share-
holders through cash dividends rather than buybacks reduces the corpora-
tion’s share price. When a company’s share price declines, so too does the 
value of employees’ stock options. Managers who hold stock options thus 
have an incentive to favor buybacks over cash dividends. Cross-firm com-
parisons provide some support for the view that option-based compensa-
tion contributed to the buyback rise.99  
In theory, corporations could grant “dividend-protected” stock op-
tions to executives and other employees. While there are several ways to 
achieve dividend protection, one method commonly used in the over-the-
counter options market (and therefore known as “over-the-counter divi-
dend protection”) is to reduce the strike price of a call option by the 
amount of the dividend paid.100 However, U.S. tax rules have made over-
the-counter dividend protection extremely unattractive for U.S. corpora-
tions compensating executives and other employees in option form. Com-
pensatory stock options are subject to section 409A of the Internal Reve-
nue Code if the exercise price could under any circumstances be reduced 
below the fair market value of the stock on the day that the option was 
granted.101 The consequences of section 409A’s application are severe and 
include acceleration of taxable income before exercise and a 20% excise 
tax.102 Likewise, prior to the December 2017 tax law, the exemption from 
section 162(m) for performance-based pay did not apply to stock options 
if the exercise price could be reduced below fair market value as of the 
grant date.103 A fair market value exercise price with dividend protection 
                                                                                                                                             
 97. Press Release, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Issues Final Statement on Ac-
counting for Share-Based Payment (Dec. 16, 2004), 
https://www.fasb.org/news/nr121604_ebc.shtml [https://perma.cc/5QN3-LJLR]. 
 98. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got 
There, in 2A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211, 224 fig.2 (George M. Constan-
tinides, Milton Harris & René M. Stulz eds., 2013). 
 99. See Christine Jolls, Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6467, 1998), https://www.nber.org/papers/w6467 
[https://perma.cc/6SJN-QBCX]. 
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a discussion, see Robert Geske, Richard Roll & Kuldeep Shastri, Over-the-Counter Option Mar-
ket Dividend Protection and “Biases” in the Black-Scholes Model: A Note, 38 J. FIN. 1271 (1983). 
 101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(A)(1) (2007). 
 102. See I.R.C. § 409A (2018). 
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would not qualify for the exemption.  Recall that one of the reasons for 
paying executives in stock options so that compensation over $1 million 
could be deductible to the corporation. Using dividend-protected stock op-
tions would have defeated this objective. 
While the rise of stock-option-based compensation may help to ex-
plain the increasing frequency of buybacks from the 1980s until the mid-
2000s, stock options cannot account for the more recent uptick in buyback 
activity over the last several years. That is because the buyback boom over 
the past decade has come at a time when fewer firms are granting stock 
options to executives and other employees, and stock options are coming 
to constitute a smaller share of executive and employee pay.104 Stock 
awards, which in most cases do come with dividend protection, have sup-
planted stock options as the primary form of performance-based pay at 
publicly traded corporations.105 While stock options accounted for 60% of 
the compensation paid to top executives in a sample of S&P companies in 
2000, they accounted for only 17% of senior-executive pay in 2013.106 
Meanwhile, non-option-based stock compensation rose from 10% to 
42%.107 One observer has gone so far as to argue that stock options were 
“on the verge of extinction” by 2013.108  So while stock options may have 
played a role in the initial shift from cash dividends to buybacks, they do 
not appear to account for the continuation and acceleration of that trend.  
A third factor contributing to the rise of share repurchases—in addi-
tion to the Rule 10b-18 safe harbor and the shift toward stock options—is 
the dramatic decline in transaction costs of buying and selling stocks. The 
average commission per share traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
fell from approximately $0.25 in 1980 to well below $0.05 by the early 
2000s.109 This trend is attributable both to technological advances and to 
an increase in price competition among brokers following the SEC’s 1975 
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abolition of fixed-rate brokerage commissions.110 The decline in transac-
tion costs makes it easier for investors to generate “homemade dividends” 
by selling shares when they desire liquidity. The availability of homemade 
dividends, in turn, makes cash dividends less attractive. Note, though, that 
the same development allows shareholders who do not desire liquidity to 
reinvest dividends at lower cost—thus reducing the disadvantage of divi-
dends for some shareholders. The increasing popularity of dividend-rein-
vestment plans—which allow a corporation’s shareholders to purchase ad-
ditional shares with dividends directly from the company without 
commission—has done the same.111 Thus, the causal relationship between 
the decline in transaction costs and the rise in buybacks is not crystal clear. 
Interestingly, the rise in buybacks relative to cash dividends does not 
appear to be a function of changes in tax rules that make buybacks more 
attractive. If anything, the tax advantage of buybacks relative to dividends 
is smaller today than it once was. From 1954 until 1986 and again from 1990 
to 2003,112 dividends were taxed at a higher rate than long-term capital 
gains, thus adding a rate advantage to the deferral advantage of buybacks. 
Moreover, the tax advantage of deferral increases with the nominal inter-
est rate, which is lower today than at most points in the past half-century.113 
Finally, the advent and expansion of IRAs and similar tax-preferred sav-
ings vehicles have created newer and larger opportunities for Americans 
to hold corporate stock in accounts that neutralize the tax disadvantage of 
dividends.114 
The December 2017 tax law does appear to have contributed to the 
recent buyback boom, but not because it increased the tax advantage of 
buybacks relative to dividends (it did not). Rather, the December 2017 law 
allowed U.S. corporations to repatriate earnings from offshore subsidiaries 
at no incremental tax cost, freeing up funds for corporate distributions of 
all sorts.115 This development may—as will be discussed in Part III—
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provide a new impetus for changes to the Internal Revenue Code that level 
the playing field between buybacks and cash dividends, but the buyback 
advantage has long been embedded in U.S. tax law. 
II. Chirelstein’s Proposal 
Given that the buyback boom of the 1980s was still more than a dec-
ade off, Professor Chirelstein’s proposal in 1969 to level the tax playing 
field between buybacks and cash dividends was arguably an idea before its 
time. Chirelstein’s interest in the topic was likely piqued by a buyback 
boomlet in the early to mid-1960s—his first footnote notes that corpora-
tions listed on the New York Stock Exchange paid out more than $1.3 bil-
lion to repurchase shares in 1963.116 But to put that figure in perspective, 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange paid out approximately 
$13 billion in cash dividends that same year,117 so even during the buyback 
boomlet, repurchases constituted less than tenth of corporate cash distri-
butions by New York-listed firms. 
While the buyback boomlet of the 1960s was little more than a blip by 
the standards of later years, Chirelstein nonetheless perceived the differ-
ential tax treatment of buybacks and cash dividends to be a tax policy prob-
lem. To address this problem, Chirelstein suggested that all cash distribu-
tions by publicly traded corporations be treated like cash dividends. 
Chirelstein’s basic insight was that every buyback can be redescribed as—
and taxed as—a cash dividend followed by a sale of shares from redeeming 
shareholders to nonredeeming shareholders. 
In this part, we introduce Chirelstein’s proposal through a series of 
illustrations. We then discuss a number of complications and implementa-
tion challenges. We conclude the Part by examining Chirelstein’s justifica-
tions for his approach. 
A. The Basics 
Chirelstein’s proposal is perhaps easiest to understand by way of ex-
ample. Recall again Examples 1 and 2 above, which we reprint here for 
easy reference: 
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Example 1. ChirelsteinCorp issues 100 shares for $1 each. A and B each 
buy 50 shares. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $100 in profits, which causes the 
value of each share to rise from $1 to $2 (assuming that market value equals 
book value). ChirelsteinCorp thereafter decides to distribute its $100 of 
earnings to its shareholders. ChirelsteinCorp does so by repurchasing 50 
shares. A chooses to redeem all 50 of her shares; B chooses not to redeem. 
The total cost of the buyback to ChirelsteinCorp is $100; A receives $100 
and B receives zero; and the value of each ChirelsteinCorp share remains 
$2. B now owns all 50 outstanding shares of ChirelsteinCorp, which is worth 
$100.  
 
Example 2. ChirelsteinCorp issues 100 shares for $1 each. A and B each 
buy 50 shares. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $100 in profits, which causes the 
value of each share to rise from $1 to $2 (assuming that market value equals 
book value). ChirelsteinCorp thereafter decides to distribute its $100 of 
earnings to its shareholders. ChirelsteinCorp does so by issuing a cash divi-
dend of $1 per share, causing the value of each share to fall from $2 back to 
$1. Afterwards, B uses the $50 she has received through the cash dividend 
to purchase A’s 50 shares. B now owns all 100 outstanding shares of Chirel-
steinCorp, which is worth $100. 
 
Chirelstein would treat Example 1 the same as Example 2. That is, he 
would treat Example 1 as if the corporation had paid a cash dividend of $1 
per share, causing the value of each share to decline by $1, and then the 
nonredeeming shareholder had purchased the redeeming shareholder’s 
stake. A and B would each have $50 of dividend income, on which they 
would owe tax. A would owe no capital gains tax because the sale price ($1 
per share) is equal to her basis. B would now have basis of $100, reflecting 
the amount that she paid for her own shares plus the amount that she is 
deemed to have paid to A for A’s shares. 
 
Table 4. Tax Consequences of Buybacks vs. Dividends— 
Status Quo vs. Chirelstein Proposal 
 A B 
Example 1 
Initial Holdings 50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
After Corp Earns $100 
Profits 
50 shares x $2 50 shares x $2 
$100 Buyback -50 shares x $2 — 
Final Holdings 0 50 shares x $2 
Status Quo 
Taxable Dividends $0 $0 





$0 50 shares x ($2 - $1) 
= $50 
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Chirelstein Proposal 
Taxable Dividends $50 $50 





$0 100 shares x ($1 - 
$1) = $0 
Example 2 
Initial Holdings 50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
After Corp Earns $100 
Profits 
50 shares x $2 50 shares x $2 
$100 Dividend 50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
Holdings Post-Divi-
dend 
50 shares x $1 50 shares x $1 
Post-Dividend Pur-
chase/Sale 
-50 shares x $1 +50 shares x $1 
Final Holdings 0 100 shares x $1 
Taxable Dividends $50 $50 





$0 100 shares x ($1 - 
$1) = $0 
 
Two more examples may reinforce the point: 
 
Example 3. ChirelsteinCorp has 100 shares of stock outstanding, with five 
investors (A, B, C, D, and E) each owning 20 shares. The value of each share 
is $0.80, and each shareholder’s basis is zero. ChirelsteinCorp then earns 
$20, causing the value of each share to rise to $1. ChirelsteinCorp uses its 
$20 of earnings to repurchase shares. Only A elects to participate in the 
buyback, and she chooses to redeem all of her shares at $1 per share. 
 
Under current law, the transaction would be treated as the disposition 
of a capital asset by A, with A paying capital gains tax on $20, which is the 
difference between her amount realized ($20) and her basis ($0). Under 
Chirelstein’s proposal, the transaction would be broken down into two 
steps. At step one, the corporation would pay a cash dividend of $0.20 per 
share to A, B, C, D, and E. Assuming that each shareholder holds her 
shares in a taxable account, each would owe a tax at the dividend rate on 
$4 (i.e., $0.20 per share times 20 shares), and the value of each share would 
decline by $0.20. At step two, A would be treated as if she had sold all of 
her shares for $0.80 per share. She would thus owe capital gains tax on $16 
(i.e., the sale price of $0.80 per share minus her basis of $0.00 per share, 
multiplied by 20 shares). B, C, D, and E would each acquire five new shares 
of ChirelsteinCorp stock from A with a basis of $0.80 per share. The result 
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is that each of these shareholders end up with a total of $4 basis in their 
shares (up from $0). Thus, under Chirelstein’s proposal, A ends ups with 
$4 of dividend income and $16 of capital gain, in contrast with $20 of capital 
gain under current law. Each of B, C, D, and E ends up with $4 of dividend 
income and a $4 basis increase, while under current law they would expe-
rience no immediate tax consequences or basis adjustment. 
 
Example 4. ChirelsteinCorp has 100 shares of stock outstanding, with five 
investors (A, B, C, D, and E) each owning 20 shares. The value of each share 
is $0.90, and all shares have a basis of zero. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $10, 
causing the value of each share to rise to $1. ChirelsteinCorp uses its $10 of 
earnings to repurchase shares. Only A elects to participate in the buyback, 
and she chooses to redeem 10 of her shares at $1 per share. 
 
Again, current law would treat the transaction as the disposition of a 
capital asset by A, with A paying capital gains tax on $10, which is the 
amount realized ($10) minus her zero basis. Chirelstein would separate the 
transaction into (i) the payment of a cash dividend of $0.10 per share to all 
shareholders, which causes the value of each share to decline by $0.10, fol-
lowed by (ii) the sale by A of 10 shares at a price of $0.90 per share. All 
five shareholders would recognize dividend income of $0.10 per share ($2 
total). A would owe capital gains tax on $9, which is equal to a sale price 
of $0.90 per share minus basis of zero multiplied by 10 shares. She would 
now hold 10 shares with a value of $0.90 per share and a basis of zero, for 
an unrealized gain of $9 going forward. B, C, D, and E would each acquire 
2.5 new shares from A with a basis of $0.90 per share, or $2.25 in total. 
Each would now hold 22.5 shares with a value of $0.90 per share ($20.25 
total) and a basis of $0.90 in 2.25 of those shares ($2.25 total). Each would 
thus have a total unrealized gain of $18 going forward. 
 Two aspects of this redescription are somewhat inelegant. First, the 
redescribed transaction leaves the corporation with a different number of 
outstanding shares than it actually has. Thus, we have redescribed the 
transaction in Example 4 as if B, C, D, and E had each purchased 2.25 
shares from A, when in fact, A’s shares were redeemed and cancelled. Sec-
ond, in the redescribed transaction, the corporation has a different share 
price than it actually has. Thus, in Example 4, the redescription imagines 
that the corporation’s share price falls from $1 per share to $0.90, when in 
fact, the corporation’s shares would continue to trade for $1. 
The easiest way to smooth over this inelegance is to adjust the basis 
of all shares by the amount of the imputed dividend, and otherwise to re-
spect real-world share cancellations and price changes. Though Chirelstein 
does not explicitly adopt this approach, his analysis appears to assume it.118 
                                                                                                                                             
 118. See Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 752-53 (explaining, in an example, that the nonre-
deemers’ aggregate basis would simply be increased by the deemed dividend).   
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Thus, in Example 4, after taxing each shareholder on an imputed dividend 
of $0.10 per share, we would adjust each shareholder’s basis upward by 
$0.10. The redeeming shareholder (A) would have a capital gain of $1 per 
share minus her new basis of $0.10 per share, multiplied by 10, for a total 
of $9. Shares that are redeemed and cancelled could be treated as such, so 
A would now hold 10 shares and B, C, D, and E would each hold 20. Each 
shareholder would have a basis of $0.10 per share going forward. A would 
thus have an unrealized gain going forward of $9 (i.e., a share price of $1 
per share minus a basis of $0.10 per share, multiplied by 10 shares). B, C, 
D, and E each would have an unrealized gain of $18 going forward (i.e., a 
share price of $1 per share minus a basis of $0.10 per share, multiplied by 
20 shares).119  
A more technical accounting of the recharacterized transaction (i.e., 
distributions of cash to all shareholders followed by purchases of redeemed 
shares) would give the newly acquired shares of B, C, D, and E a fair mar-
ket value basis, while their old shares’ basis would be unaffected.  Broadly 
speaking, the basis-adjustment approach we recommend is consistent with 
this more precise accounting of the transaction because each shareholder’s 
overall stock basis is the same regardless.120 
In general, the basis-adjustment approach will put nonredeeming 
shareholders at a (sometimes slight) disadvantage relative to a scenario in 
which the corporation actually pays a dividend and some shareholders use 
the dividend to acquire stock from others. To illustrate, recall again Exam-
ple 3: 
 
Example 3. ChirelsteinCorp has 100 shares of stock outstanding, with five 
investors (A, B, C, D, and E) each owning 20 shares. The value of each share 
is $0.80, and each shareholder’s basis is zero. ChirelsteinCorp then earns 
$20, causing the value of each share to rise to $1. ChirelsteinCorp uses its 
$20 of earnings to repurchase shares. Only A elects to participate in the 
buyback, and she chooses to redeem all of her shares at $1 per share. 
 
If the corporation had simply distributed a dividend of $0.20 per share 
and B, C, D, and E each had used their dividend to purchase five shares of 
stock from A, the value of each share would be $0.80, the nonredeeming 
shareholders would each hold 25 shares (their original 20 plus the 5 pur-
chased from A), and each would have a fair market value basis in the shares 
bought from A. If one of the nonredeeming shareholders (say, B) then 
chose to liquidate $4 of her holdings, she could choose to sell the five shares 
with fair market value basis and pay a capital gains tax of zero. She would 
                                                                                                                                             
 119. The effect is that of a reverse stock split.  In Example 4, there would be a 4:5 stock 
split.  Reverse stock splits are tax-free, and the basis of the canceled shares are added to the basis 
of the remaining shares. See I.R.C. § 305 (2018). 
 120. See Yale, supra note 19, at 352-53 (noting this distinction). 
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then have $16 of unrealized gains going forward ($0.80 per share multiplied 
by 20 shares).  
If the corporation bought back A’s shares, then the basis-adjustment 
approach would respect the fact that B, C, D, and E actually own only 20 
shares with a value of $1 per share, and it would adjust the basis of each 
share from zero to $0.20. If B then chose to liquidate $4 of her holdings, 
she would sell four shares and pay capital gains tax on $3.20 (an amount 
realized of $1 per share minus a basis of $0.20 per share, multiplied by 4 
shares), and she would have $12.80 of unrealized gains going forward 
($0.80 per share multiplied by 16 remaining shares). She would have lost 
the ability to cherry-pick among shares so as to defer capital gains tax.121 
 
Table 5. Tax Consequences of Buybacks— 
Status Quo vs. Precise Accounting vs. Basis Adjustment 




20 shares  
x $0.80 
20 shares  
x $0.80 
20 shares  
x $0.80 
20 shares  
x $0.80 





20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 




-20 shares  
x $1.00 
— — — — 
Final 
Holdings 
0 20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 









20 shares  
x  
($1 - $0)  
= $20 




$0 $20 $20 $20 $20 
                                                                                                                                             
 121. In other cases, the basis-adjustment approach could benefit nonredeemers. For ex-
ample, in the case of an actual dividend reinvestment, the holding period for the newly purchased 
shares would begin upon purchase, meaning that if those shares were sold for a gain within a year, 
the gain would be characterized as a short-term capital gain (and taxed at ordinary rates). Under 
the basis-adjustment approach, by contrast, the shareholder could sell within a year of the redemp-
tion and potentially claim a long-term capital gain (taxed at preferential rates). 





20 shares  
x $0.20 
= $4 
20 shares  
x $0.20 
= $4 
20 shares  
x $0.20 
= $4 
20 shares  
x $0.20 
= $4 
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x ($0.80 - 
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x ($0.80 - 
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x ($0.80 - 








20 shares  
x $0.20 
= $4 
20 shares  
x $0.20 
= $4 
20 shares  
x $0.20 
= $4 
20 shares  
x $0.20 
= $4 
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Table 6. Tax Consequences of Buybacks— 
Status Quo vs. Precise Accounting vs. Basis Adjustment 




20 shares  
x $0.90 
20 shares  
x $0.90 
20 shares  
x $0.90 
20 shares  
x $0.90 





20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 




-20 shares  
x $1.00 
— — — — 
Final 
Holdings 
0 20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 
20 shares  
x $1.00 











20 shares  
x ($1 - $0)  
= $20 








20 shares  
x $0.10 
= $2 
20 shares  
x $0.10 
= $2 
20 shares  
x $0.10 
= $2 
20 shares  
x $0.10 
= $2 







x ($0.90 - 
$0) = $18 




$0 20 shares 
x ($0.90 - 






x ($0.90 - 






x ($0.90 - 






x ($0.90 - 








20 shares  
x $0.10 
= $2 
20 shares  
x $0.10 
= $2 
20 shares  
x $0.10 
= $2 
20 shares  
x $0.10 
= $2 







x ($0.90 - 
$0) = $18 




$0 20 shares 
















Chirelstein suggested that his proposal should apply to public compa-
nies but not to closely held private firms. He thought that the “basic legis-
lative aim” of the Code provisions governing buybacks and dividends was 
“to bear lightly on withdrawals” from “closely-held or family-owned cor-
porations”—and in his view, that aim should be respected.122 Chirelstein 
was writing well before the advent of the limited liability company (LLC) 
                                                                                                                                             
 122. Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 750. 
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and the significant liberalization of the S corporation limitations, so many 
closely held businesses were then organized as C corporations.  Now, how-
ever, the overwhelming majority of closely held businesses are organized 
as pass-throughs.123 Likewise, Chirelstein was writing before the private-
equity boom of the late twentieth century made it relatively easy for public 
companies to raise capital from other sources and remove their shares from 
stock exchanges—and well before “unicorn” start-ups such as Uber and 
Airbnb achieved multibillion-dollar valuations before going to public eq-
uity markets.  
In the current climate, we think that a public/nonpublic distinction 
would be unwise, as it could encourage public companies seeking to go pri-
vate or private companies staying private to achieve a more favorable tax 
regime. And due to the popularity of flow-through structures for closely 
held businesses, concerns about taxing withdrawals from those businesses 
are vastly mitigated. We will therefore proceed on the assumption that 
Chirelstein’s proposal would apply to all corporations under subchapter C, 
whether or not their shares are publicly traded.    
As will soon be apparent, we believe that Chirelstein’s proposal—with 
the above-mentioned modifications—represents an ingenious solution to a 
difficult and important tax policy problem. Yet Chirelstein’s explanation 
of his proposal is vulnerable to criticism on two fronts. First, Chirelstein 
never addresses the administrative, compliance, and political challenges 
that his proposal would entail. Second, while Chirelstein argues at some 
length that buybacks and cash dividends are economically equivalent, he 
                                                                                                                                             
 123. Some closely held organizations are still formed as C corporations.  Some profes-
sional associations are organized as C corporations and “zero out” all of their income through 
compensation paid to the owner-employees. These organizations will be unaffected by the pro-
posal because they do not have earnings and profits and do not make distributions. In addition, 
start-ups that seek venture-capital financing are often formed as C corporations. See generally 
Gregg D. Polsky, Explaining the Choice-of-Entity Decisions by Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 70 
HASTINGS L.J. 409 (2019) (discussing how lawyers commonly recommend C-corporation struc-
tures to their start-up clients). These start-ups typically generate large losses while they are private.  
The vast majority fail, while the successful ones often go public or are acquired by a public com-
pany within their first decade. See id. at 428. Occasionally, a successful start-up will linger as a 
private company for more than a decade.  The proposal will generally not affect start-ups because 
they do not earn profits and, if they do, they reinvest those profits. If and when they start earning 
and distributing profits, they often will be a public company (or a subsidiary of one). 
Closely held businesses organized as C corporations before the advent of the LLC will, in 
some cases, retain the C corporation form because tax rules make conversions of profitable C 
corporations to LLCs quite costly. See id. at 414 (noting that tax reclassifications of C corporations 
to LLCs and other tax partnerships are often financially infeasible because they require deemed 
or actual liquidations of the C corporation, which triggers immediate double taxation).  One pos-
sibility would be to implement a grandfather rule that would exempt C corporations formed prior 
to 1998 (when the check-the-box regulations were finalized) if they have 100 or fewer shareholders 
(the threshold for S corporation status today). Note, though, that shareholders of closely held cor-
porations generally have influence over firm payout policies, and so if buybacks generate liquidity 
problems for those shareholders, they can have their corporations distribute cash through divi-




never explains why the appropriate tax policy response to this economic 
equivalence is to tax buybacks the same way that we currently tax cash 
dividends (rather than taxing cash dividends the same way we currently tax 
buybacks). 
B. Implementation Challenges 
One challenge in implementing Chirelstein’s proposal involves the ap-
plication of taxes on cash dividends to nonredeeming shareholders who—
in reality—received no cash. This is sometimes called the “phantom in-
come” problem.124 Recall that under Chirelstein’s proposal, nonredeeming 
shareholders are deemed to have received cash dividends and then to have 
reinvested those dividends in the corporation. So what if the nonredeeming 
shareholders do not have the cash to pay the tax they now owe? 
As noted above, although Chirelstein limited his proposal to public 
companies, applying his proposal to public companies but not to other C 
corporations backed by private equity would create strong incentives for 
firms to leave public markets. Nevertheless, the primary impact of our pro-
posal will be on public companies. For public-company shareholders, there 
generally will not be substantial liquidity issues for U.S. shareholders be-
cause they can easily sell or borrow against their shares to pay the tax. Sell-
ing a small percentage of public-company shares to approximate the cash 
flow of dividends is already a popular investment strategy. If necessary, 
these so-called “homemade dividends” can be used to pay the tax. 
On the other hand, the liquidity issue is trickier in the context of for-
eign investors—nonresident aliens and foreign corporations—who are sub-
ject to a tax of up to 30% on dividends paid by U.S. corporations. Under 
current law, the federal government collects this tax by requiring domestic 
corporations to withhold dividend payments to foreign investors at the 
source and then to remit those amounts to the IRS.125 But how would with-
holding work when no cash dividend is actually paid? And if those foreign 
investors have no other assets in the United States, then how can the 
United States collect the tax that is due on imputed dividends?  
One possibility is that U.S. corporations might respond to the Chirel-
stein proposal by switching entirely from buybacks to cash dividends. After 
all, while the taxation of shareholders who lack the liquidity to pay the tax 
poses a headache for the IRS, it is a headache for those shareholders as 
well. If some shareholders want to dispose of their interests and others 
want to increase their ownership percentage, then they can transact among 
                                                                                                                                             
 124. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir C. Chenchinski, The Case for a Dividend Deduction, 
65 TAX L. 3, 8 (2011). 
 125. See I.R.C. § 1441 (2018) (requiring withholding at the source by U.S. persons with 
respect to dividends and other fixed and determinable income items paid to non-U.S. persons). 
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each other rather than directly with the corporation. As noted above, cor-
porations potentially would have an incentive to pay dividends, which 
shareholders who want to remain invested in the corporation could use to 
buy stock from shareholders who want to liquidate—thereby allowing the 
remaining shareholders to take a fair market value basis in some of their 
shares.126 
Another possibility is that corporations—either by their own volition 
or by legal mandate—could pay a cash dividend of at least $0.43 for every 
$1 they expend on buybacks. The reason why we choose $0.43 (or rather, 
.3/0.7, which rounds up to 0.43) is that the highest U.S. tax rate on dividends 
paid by domestic corporations is the 30% tax on dividends paid to nonres-
ident aliens and foreign corporations in jurisdictions that have not entered 
into a tax treaty modifying the default rate. If a corporation pays a cash 
dividend of $0.43 for every $1 it spends on buybacks, then a nonredeeming 
shareholder will owe tax on $1.43. Applying a 30% rate to $1.43 results in 
a tax liability of $0.43 (or, without rounding, $0.429). By withholding the 
entire cash dividend from foreign investors in nontreaty jurisdictions,127 
U.S. corporations can ensure that withholding obligations are satisfied.128 
To illustrate, consider again Example 3. The corporation chooses to 
distribute its $20 of earnings ($0.20 per share). Imagine that instead of re-
turning all of that cash through dividends or all via buybacks, the corpora-
tion pays a cash dividend of $0.06 per share ($6 total, or 30 percent of $20) 
and buys back shares worth $14. Again, A elects to participate in the buy-
back, and she redeems 14 shares at a price of $1 per share. Under Chirel-
stein’s proposal, A, B, C, D, and E each would report as income the $0.06 
per share cash dividend and the $0.14 per share imputed dividend, or $0.20 
per share in total. If one of the nonredeeming shareholders is a nonresident 
alien or foreign corporation in a nontreaty jurisdiction, she will owe tax of 
30% times $0.20 per share, or $0.06 per share, which is equal to the amount 
                                                                                                                                             
 126. As mentioned above, many corporations already have dividend reinvestment plans 
(DRIPs) in effect, and one might think that, if the proposal were enacted, these might be used to 
adjust ownership percentages. See supra notes 43, 48, 111 and accompanying text. The shares is-
sued through these plans are often treasury shares, which are acquired by companies through buy-
backs, though corporations could also issue new shares to satisfy DRIP demand. 
 127. Because all shareholders of the same class must be treated alike, the 43-cent cash 
dividend would have to be paid on all shares, not just those owned by foreign shareholders.  While 
a foreign shareholder’s 43-cent dividend would be subject to withholding (and the 30% rate would 
be entirely withheld), for other shareholders, the dividend would be paid in full to the shareholder.  
In essence, the 43-cent cash dividend solution would result in the corporation distributing no more 
than 57% of its annual distributions to a class of stock in the form of redemptions. 
 128. Another, less intrusive, approach would be to allow the company to sell a portion 
of a nonredeeming foreign shareholder’s shares to satisfy the withholding tax obligation. This ap-
proach would effectively mandate the participation of foreigners in a buyback to the extent nec-
essary to pay the withholding tax. The foreigner could then, if it wished, purchase shares on the 
open market to restore its ownership percentage back to the status quo prior to the mandated sale. 
A significant practical problem with this approach is that it would treat foreigner shareholders and 
domestic shareholders disparately, which could violate existing tax-treaty rules.   
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of the cash dividend. The U.S. corporation can satisfy its withholding obli-
gations by remitting all of the foreign investor’s cash dividends to the IRS. 
Our own view is that a legal requirement that corporations pay $0.43 
in cash dividends for every $1 of share buybacks would fully neutralize the 
phantom income objection to Chirelstein’s proposal. More precisely, the 
requirement would be that the ratio of cash dividends to buybacks be equal 
to t/(1 – t), where t represents the highest applicable tax rate on dividends. 
While such a requirement would constrain corporations in their choice of 
form for cash distributions, the constraint seems minor given that every 
economic outcome that can be achieved through buybacks also can be at-
tained through a mix of buybacks and cash dividends. 
A more heavy-handed approach would be to outlaw buybacks en-
tirely, thereby requiring that nonliquidating corporate distributions always 
be accomplished through cash dividends. This would eliminate all liquidity 
concerns and would be straightforward to administer. It is also consistent 
with Chirelstein’s fundamental insight that, leaving aside tax conse-
quences, buybacks and dividends are economically equivalent. Neverthe-
less, outlawing buybacks could have profound repercussions in other con-
texts. For example, while option compensation is losing popularity, it still 
exists, and section 409A effectively forecloses dividend protection. Absent 
amendment to section 409A, outlawing buybacks would make option-
based compensation much less attractive because the value of a manager’s 
options would decline every time the corporation distributes cash to share-
holders. For critics of stock option-based compensation, this outcome may 
be a feature rather than a bug.129 It is, however, an outcome that Congress 
should consider directly rather than generating as an accidental byproduct 
of a tax policy change. 
A second—and similarly soluble—challenge in implementing Chirel-
stein’s proposal relates to basis tracking.130 In the normal course, a 
                                                                                                                                             
 129. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 49, 60 (2003). 
 130. This concern (and the related concern of requiring shareholders to report imputed 
dividends) formed the basis for William Andrews’s recommendation that, in lieu of the Chirelstein 
proposal, Congress should impose a corporate excise tax on redemptions.  See AM. LAW INST., 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 
AND DISPOSITIONS 472-73 (1982). The corporate excise-tax rate would equal the average effective 
shareholder-level tax rate on corporate dividends. Andrews acknowledged that the Chirelstein 
approach would yield a more exact equivalence between dividends and buybacks. Id. at 472. An-
drews’s excise tax would undertax (relative to a dividend baseline) repurchases by firms whose 
continuing shareholders were in high brackets and would over-tax (relative to the dividend base-
line) repurchases by firms whose continuing shareholders were predominantly tax-exempt or low-
bracket taxpayers.  Id. at 473. Andrews nevertheless preferred the excise tax primarily for its rel-
ative simplicity. Id. However, as explained in the text, brokers are now required to report stock 
basis amounts to their clients and to the IRS thereby dramatically easing the compliance burdens 
noted by Andrews.  See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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shareholder’s adjusted basis in stock is simply the purchase price plus the 
cost of purchase (e.g., brokerage commissions).131 Under our basis-adjust-
ment version of Chirelstein’s proposal, a shareholder would take an up-
ward basis adjustment equal to the amount of any imputed cash dividend. 
The reason for the basis adjustment is to reflect the fact (or perhaps more 
accurately, the fiction) that the shareholder has received the cash dividend 
and reinvested that amount in the corporation. So when a taxpayer ulti-
mately sells her shares (assuming no step-up in basis along the way), she 
will have to know not only how much she paid for the shares (plus com-
missions), but also how much she has recognized as imputed dividend in-
come since then.132 
This additional element in the basis calculus will complicate tax com-
pliance marginally. We do not expect, however, that the compliance bur-
den will be any more than marginal. Existing law requires tracking of stock 
splits, spinoffs, and mergers. Brokers have been required to track and re-
port their customers’ basis in equities since 2011.133 Several automated ba-
sis tracking programs allow brokers to comply with these reporting 
                                                                                                                                             
In a similar vein, George Yin in 1990 proposed a corporate distributions tax, which would 
be paid by the corporation whenever it made distributions, regardless of the form of the distribu-
tion. See George K. Yin, A Different Approach to the Taxation of Corporate Distributions: The-
ory and Implementation of a Uniform Corporate-Level Distributions Tax, 78 GEO. L.J. 1837 
(1990). Yin’s approach would represent a more sweeping reform measure than either the Andrews 
or the Chirelstein proposals because Yin would tax all distributions the same regardless of the tax 
status of the shareholder. Andrews would continue to take into account shareholder tax status for 
dividend distributions (but not for repurchases), while Chirelstein would continue to take into 
account shareholder tax status for both dividends and repurchases. Chirelstein’s more nuanced 
treatment of dividends and repurchases is more significant now than at the time of the Andrews 
and Yin proposals due to the recent growth of tax-exempt ownership of public-company stock, 
which is now estimated to total more than 40% of market capitalization. See supra note 80 and 
accompanying text. 
To be clear, our argument here is not that Chirelstein’s approach is “better” than Andrews’s 
or Yin’s on the basis of first principles. Andrews’s approach would effectively eliminate the benefit 
of shareholder-level income-tax exemptions with respect to repurchases from the perspective of 
pension plans, IRAs, and nonprofit-institution shareholders. Yin’s approach would effectively 
eliminate the benefit of shareholder-level income-tax exemptions with respect to repurchases and 
dividends from those shareholders’ perspective. Yin, supra, at 1871-77. Whether that is an ad-
vantage or disadvantage depends, ultimately, on one’s view of the desirability of tax exemption 
for pension plans, IRAs, and nonprofit institutions. A feature of Chirelstein’s approach is that it 
addresses the buyback problem without upending the entire corporate and shareholder-level in-
come tax system. See infra Section IV.C. 
 131. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions: Stocks (Options, Splits, Traders), INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV. (July 15, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/faqs/capital-gains-losses-and-sale-of-
home/stocks-options-splits-traders/stocks-options-splits-traders-1 [https://perma.cc/D8XS-
6AGM]. 
 132. Basis tracking would be more complicated if, instead of adjusting basis in all shares 
by the amount of the imputed dividend, nonredeeming shareholders were treated as if they had 
bought a block of stock from redeeming shareholders and taken a fair market value basis in those 
new shares. 
 133. See Jonathan Horn, The Brave New World of Cost Basis Reporting, J. ACCT. (Sept. 





requirements at modest cost.134 Updating these basis-tracking solutions to 
include imputed dividends would not require a significant technological 
leap. 
A final hurdle to Chirelstein’s proposal is political. As Ethan Yale 
writes, “Any proponent of Chirelstein’s proposal would have to conquer 
the public relations difficulty that nonredeemed shareholders would be 
taxed even when they chose not to sell, ‘merely’ because of the actions of 
others.”135 This public-relations difficulty would be mitigated somewhat by 
the fact that only about a quarter of U.S. households own stock directly.136 
Individuals who hold stock in tax-preferred retirement plans or accounts 
such as 401(k)s and IRAs would be unaffected because those vehicles are 
exempt from any tax on dividend income.137 Even so, the taxation of 
“phantom” income has long been thought to operate as an insuperable ob-
stacle to proposals such as Chirelstein’s that separate taxation from reali-
zation.138 
Our suggestion that corporations be required to pay $0.43 in divi-
dends for every $1 of buybacks would eliminate the phantom income prob-
lem entirely (given current tax rates). As tax rates change, the minimum 
dividend-to-buyback ratio could change too. This modification—along 
with the groundswell of antipathy toward buybacks—may give Chirel-
stein’s proposal the political traction today that it lacked 50 years ago. 
While it is too soon to say how long the current anti-buyback moment will 
last, it is not impossible to think that it will last long enough to see through 
changes to the buyback tax regime. 
                                                                                                                                             
 134. See Carolyn T. Geer, New Tax Reporting Rules, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703727804576017984041795712 
[https://perma.cc/R9JV-8Q4A]. 
 135. Yale, supra note 19, at 353. Yale noted that the same result occurs in economically 
identical cases where some shareholders receive a cash dividend and others a stock dividend. See 
id. In such a situation, all shareholders would receive a taxable dividend. See I.R.C. § 305(b)(2) 
(2018). While this is true, it is doubtful whether this technical point will have any political salience 
with either voters or policymakers.   
 136. See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. 
Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 926 (2016). 
 137. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (exempting qualified retirement accounts from taxation). 
 138. See, e.g., Clarissa Potter, Mark-to-Market Taxation as the Way to Save the Income 
Tax—A Former Administrator’s View, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 879, 901 (1999) (arguing that individ-
uals and politicians would exhibit “antipathy” toward “any rule that taxes income before it is re-
alized”).  On the other hand, Congress already has provided for taxation on “phantom” income in 
a very similar situation.  Section 305(c) authorizes Treasury regulations that would apply to 
changes in conversion ratios, changes in redemption prices, differences between redemption prices 
and issue prices, redemptions which are (under current law) recharacterized as distributions, and 
other similar transactions. I.R.C. § 305(c) (2018). Treasury Regulation 1.305-7, promulgated pur-
suant to this authority, imposes tax on shareholders whose proportionate interest in the corpora-
tion is increased as a result of these transactions. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7 (1995). Like the nonre-
deemers under the Chirelstein approach, these shareholders are taxed on such an increase even 
though they are mere bystanders to the transaction and receive no cash or other property in the 
transaction. We thank Lawrence Zelenak for pointing out the section 305(c) analogy. 
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C. Justification 
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming in Chirelstein’s explanation of 
his own proposal is the lack of a normative foundation for his prescription. 
Chirelstein convincingly showed that “share repurchasing and ordinary 
dividend payments are largely interchangeable from an economic stand-
point.”139 He did not demonstrate, however, why the differential tax treat-
ment of buybacks and dividends is a policy problem, beyond the fact that 
it arguably offends an aesthetic interest in seeing like transactions taxed 
alike. If the consequence of differential taxation is that corporations 
choose to distribute cash through buybacks rather than cash dividends, 
then the efficiency loss is small precisely because the two forms are essen-
tially equivalent.  
Arguably, the differential taxation of buybacks and dividends violates 
the principle of horizontal equity (i.e., the idea that similarly situated indi-
viduals should pay the same amount in tax) because two otherwise identi-
cal taxpayers will owe different amounts based on the cash distribution 
policies of the corporations in which they own shares.140 But even this prop-
osition is doubtful, because the tax efficiency of a corporation’s cash-dis-
tribution policy may affect its share price. For example, if Berkshire Hath-
away distributes cash via buybacks while Coca-Cola pays cash dividends, 
then tax-sensitive investors will—all else equal—be willing to pay a pre-
mium for Berkshire Hathaway shares. If so, then the tax advantage of buy-
backs vis-à-vis cash dividends does not represent a windfall for Berkshire 
Hathaway shareholders relative to their Coca-Cola-owning peers, as the 
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders have effectively paid for the tax benefit 
through a higher purchase price. 
Insofar as the tax efficiency of a corporation’s cash-distribution policy 
is incorporated into its share price, then the cost of equity capital may be 
lower for corporations that can credibly commit to buybacks than for cor-
porations that cannot. This potentially could result in a misallocation of 
equity capital across enterprises whose only distinguishing features are 
their tax attributes—though we are skeptical that this misallocation is eco-
nomically significant. The misallocation would arise if there are some firms 
that are especially inclined to distribute earnings through cash dividends 
rather than buybacks, and therefore cannot access equity capital on the 
same terms as repurchasing firms. But in light of the economic equivalence 
between buybacks and cash dividends, it is difficult to see why such a pref-
erence for cash dividends would arise. 
                                                                                                                                             
 139. Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 741. 
 140. Even if the differential treatment of buybacks and dividends can be characterized 
as a violation of horizontal equity, it is not clear that we should care. For doubts about the norma-
tive relevance of horizontal equity, see Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of 
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One further possibility is that the differential tax treatment of buy-
backs and dividends may lead firms to adopt suboptimal compensation ar-
rangements so as to signal that their cash distributions will be tax efficient. 
The idea would be as follows: Tax-sensitive shareholders (other than do-
mestic corporations) prefer that firms distribute earnings through buy-
backs rather than cash dividends, but they cannot know for sure whether 
firms will do so. Firms may therefore choose to compensate their managers 
in dividend-unprotected stock options so as to demonstrate to potential 
investors that distributions will be in buyback form. After all, if managers 
hold dividend-unprotected stock options, then they have a strong incentive 
to favor buybacks over cash dividends.141 Dividend-unprotected stock op-
tions may not, however, be the way those firms would choose to compen-
sate their managers in the absence of tax considerations. The upshot is that 
firms may adopt economically inefficient compensation arrangements as a 
way to commit to tax-efficient earnings distributions. 
While such a distortion is theoretically possible, we again are doubtful 
of its magnitude. First, we are aware of no corporate-law rule that would 
prohibit a company from inserting a provision into its charter or bylaws 
that requires it to distribute earnings via buybacks rather than cash divi-
dends. Thus, if a firm wants to make a credible commitment to a zero-div-
idend approach, it should be able to do so without adopting an inefficient 
compensation scheme. Second, if a firm wants to commit to a zero-divi-
dend approach but prefers to compensate managers in restricted stock ra-
ther than stock options, it can simply use dividend-unprotected restricted 
stock units (i.e., restricted stock units that do not entitle the holder to re-
ceive dividends until the stock has vested). Thus, no firm is ever “forced” 
to compensate managers in stock options rather than stock because of a 
desire to signal a commitment to buybacks. The decline in the use of com-
pensatory stock options further suggests that the tax treatment of buybacks 
is not significantly skewing pay packages toward options. 
Last but not least, even if the differential treatment of buybacks and 
cash dividends is inherently problematic, it is unclear why the solution is to 
tax buybacks like cash dividends rather than vice versa. We can achieve 
parity in the taxation of buybacks and cash dividends by treating every 
buyback like a cash dividend followed by a basis adjustment, but we can 
just as easily achieve parity by treating every cash dividend like a buyback. 
To illustrate: consider again Examples 1 and 2. In Example 1, Chirelstein-
Corp buys back 50 shares from shareholder A for $2 per share; in Example 
2, ChirelsteinCorp pays a dividend of $1 per share to each of its two inves-
tors (who hold 50 shares apiece), and shareholder B uses her dividend to 
                                                                                                                                             
 141. Cf. Jeffrey R. Brown, Nellie Liang & Scott Weisbenner, Executive Financial Incen-
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buy A out. We said that the tax treatment of the buyback (Example 1) is 
generally more favorable than the tax treatment of the cash dividend (Ex-
ample 2) because in the buyback scenario, shareholder A pays a tax on the 
buyback proceeds minus basis ($50 total), while in the cash dividend sce-
nario, each shareholder pays tax on the full amount of the dividend ($50 
per shareholder). But if the tax treatment of buybacks is not set in stone, 
neither is the tax treatment of cash dividends. We could, for example, treat 
the shareholders in Example 2 as if they had sold half their shares for $50 
per share, thus allowing them to utilize basis ($1 per share) to offset tax on 
the capital gain. More generally, a cash dividend of d paid by a corporation 
with a price per share of p could be taxed as if the shareholder had sold a 
fraction (d/p) of her interest, thus allowing the shareholder to utilize the 
same fraction (d/p) of her adjusted basis.  
Ethan Yale has developed this approach in greater detail, referring to 
it as the ‘“exchange equivalent distributions’ (EED) tax.”142 The EED tax 
would treat all corporate distributions—whether in the form of pro rata 
dividends or stock redemptions—as stock sales.143 The deemed seller, in 
the case of dividends, would be allowed to recover the proportional 
amount of her stock basis in these sales, just as the redeeming shareholder 
does in a redemption. However, in contrast with the Chirelstein proposal, 
nonredeemers would not face any tax consequences under the EED ap-
proach.   
Both the EED tax and the Chirelstein proposal would come close to 
putting dividends and repurchases on equal tax footing, the former by al-
lowing equivalent stock basis recovery and the latter by denying any such 
recovery. However, for reasons that we explain in the next Part, we believe 
that Chirelstein’s proposal is preferable to the EED tax on efficiency and 
equity grounds—specifically because we think that nonredeeming share-
holders should pay tax. The EED tax underscores, though, that the case 
for Chirelstein’s proposal cannot rest on the fact that it generates greater 
parity in the taxation of buybacks and cash dividends. After all, Yale’s 
EED tax does that too—and without the potential problem of phantom 
income. That Chirelstein failed to consider this alternative mechanism for 
achieving parity between buybacks and cash dividends is, we think, a sur-
prising omission but ultimately not a fatal flaw. 
III. The Case for Taxing Buybacks Like Dividends 
This Part evaluates the case for taxing buybacks like cash dividends. 
First, we address what we think is a red herring: the argument that buy-
backs should be taxed like cash dividends so as to discourage buybacks for 
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nontax reasons. We then move on to consider several more substantial ar-
guments for taxing buybacks like cash dividends. 
A. The Buyback Backlash 
The dramatic increase in buybacks in recent years has sparked some-
thing of a “buyback backlash,”144 with academics, politicians, and even 
some prominent financial professionals joining the chorus of criticism.145 
The crux of the critique is two-fold: first, that buybacks divert capital from 
productive investment; and second, that buybacks benefit executives at the 
expense of other stakeholders.146 We address each point in turn. 
1. Buybacks and Productive Investment 
It is hard to see why buybacks—any more than economically equiva-
lent cash dividends—divert capital from productive investment. Setting tax 
considerations aside, corporate managers who seek to maximize share-
holder value will distribute rather than reinvest earnings when the corpo-
ration has no available investment opportunities for which the expected 
rate of return exceeds the opportunity cost of capital. Put differently, man-
agers will distribute rather than reinvest earnings when shareholders can 
do better investing that money for themselves than the corporation can do 
investing on their behalf. Cash distributions—whether in the form of buy-
backs or dividends—are a sign that managers believe there are better in-
vestment opportunities outside the corporation than within. 
It is, of course, possible that managers will systematically err in decid-
ing when to distribute earnings and when to reinvest. But it is not obvious 
that such errors will be in the direction of excessive distributions. Managers 
themselves benefit from an increase in their firm’s market capitalization. 
The CEO of a $2 billion market-cap company is likely to command a higher 
salary than the CEO of a $1 billion market-cap company.147 Managers may 
therefore have an incentive to retain earnings—thereby increasing the 
book value and likely the market value of their firm’s equity—even when 
the decision that would maximize shareholder value would be to distribute 
cash via buyback or dividend. 
                                                                                                                                             
 144. See, e.g., Dan McCrum, The Buyback Backlash, GE as Exhibit A, FIN. TIMES: 
ALPHAVILLE (Feb. 19, 2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/02/19/1519031430000/The-buyback-
backlash--GE-as-exhibit-A [https://perma.cc/3DWS-PNGW]. 
 145. See Akin Oyedele, Here Is the Letter the World’s Largest Investor, BlackRock 
CEO Larry Fink, Just Sent to CEOs Everywhere, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2017, 8:10 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/blackrock-ceo-larry-fink-letter-to-ceos-2017-1 
[https://perma.cc/38AS-2GKJ]. 
 146. See, e.g., William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 2014, at 46, https://hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity [https://perma.cc/7YUS-4E8T]. 
 147. See Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 
123 Q.J. ECON. 49 (2008). 
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Even if one believes that corporations are too quick to distribute ra-
ther than reinvest earnings, that belief does not necessarily translate into 
an argument against the current tax law status quo. Somewhat counterin-
tuitively, the current tax treatment of buybacks may cause corporations to 
retain rather than distribute earnings. The reason for this—discussed at 
greater length in Section III.B—is that under current law, shareholders 
may want corporations to delay distributions so that they (and their heirs) 
can take advantage of the step-up in basis at death. Chirelstein’s proposal 
would reduce the incentive to delay nonliquidating distributions until 
death because the tax on distributions, which would be treated as divi-
dends, does not depend upon basis. If the policy objective is to discourage 
cash distributions (and we consider that to be a questionable goal), then 
taxing buybacks like dividends is not necessarily the right path. 
Finally, we should note that the evidence in support of the claim that 
buybacks are cannibalizing productive investment is quite weak. Cash re-
turned to shareholders via buybacks does not vanish; shareholders can re-
invest that cash in other enterprises. And while cash is flowing out of cor-
porations through buybacks, it is flowing back into corporations through 
new equity issuances. According to calculations by Jesse Fried and Charles 
Wang, net shareholder payouts of S&P 500 firms—buybacks plus divi-
dends minus new equity issuances—total to approximately 50% of net in-
come during the 2007 to 2016 period (and 41% of “R&D-adjusted net in-
come,” i.e., net income with research and development expenses added 
back in).148 That is, on an S&P 500-wide basis, $0.50 to $0.59 of every $1 of 
profits earned by corporations remain within the company. Meanwhile, 
cash as a percentage of total assets of S&P 500 nonfinancial firms at the 
end of the third quarter of 2019 was 10%, down from highs above 12% 
before the December 2017 tax law but well above the historical average of 
7%.149 Corporations—at least before the COVID-19 crisis struck—were 
awash in cash. All of this makes it very difficult to argue that buybacks 
were at the same time depriving companies of the liquidity they needed to 
pursue new projects. 
2. Buybacks and Executive Compensation 
The claim that buybacks benefit executives at the expense of other 
corporate stakeholders is potentially—though limitedly—true if the alter-
native to a buyback is a cash dividend and executives hold dividend-
                                                                                                                                             
 148. Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Are Buybacks Really Shortchanging Invest-
ment?, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 2018, at 88, 88, https://hbr.org/2018/03/are-buybacks-really-
shortchanging-investment [https://perma.cc/QBE7-G4GK]. 
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unprotected stock options. An equally valid way to frame the same point 
is that the choice to distribute earnings via buybacks rather than cash divi-
dends shields executives from a hit to their compensation that is unrelated 
to firm performance. Thus, while executives with compensatory stock op-
tions are generally better off when a company buys back shares rather than 
paying dividends, it is difficult to describe this benefit to executives as in 
any way illegitimate. 
Beyond the stock option context, executives are sometimes said to 
benefit from buybacks if their compensation is explicitly tied to earnings 
per share (EPS). Outspoken buyback critic William Lazonick writes that 
buybacks “automatically increase earnings per share (EPS) by decreasing 
the number of shares outstanding.”150 This claim is puzzling. Buybacks af-
fect both the numerator and denominator of a company’s earnings-per-
share calculation, and it is far from automatic that the overall effect on EPS 
will be positive. 
To illustrate: imagine a corporation with $90 of noncash assets, $10 of 
cash, no liabilities, and 100 shares outstanding. If market value equals book 
value, the value of each share will be $1. Assume that the $90 of noncash 
assets generate income of $4.50, reflecting a rate of return of 5%. The cor-
poration can use its $10 of cash to invest in new projects, repurchase shares, 
or pay a dividend. If the corporation reinvests the $10 of cash in a project 
that yields a 5% return (i.e., $0.50), then its earnings for the year will be $5 
(i.e., $4.50 plus $0.50) and its EPS will be $0.05. If the investment yields a 
return of more than 5%, then EPS will be higher than $0.05. If the yield is 
lower, then EPS will be lower.  
What if the corporation uses the $10 of cash to buy back 10 shares of 
stock at the beginning of the year? Now earnings for the year will be $4.50, 
but the number of outstanding shares will be 90. EPS will thus be $0.05. 
Note that $0.05 is the same EPS as if the firm had reinvested the $10 of 
cash at a 5% rate of return. Only if the firm is earning less than a 5% return 
on its marginal investment will buying back shares raise EPS. If the firm 
would have earned more than a 5% return on its marginal investment, buy-
ing back shares will have lowered EPS. There is no alchemy here. Return-
ing cash to shareholders when that cash otherwise would be earning a be-
low-market return boosts profitability. Returning cash to shareholders 
when that cash otherwise would be earning an above-market return re-
duces profitability.  
Finally, if the corporation uses the $10 of cash to pay a dividend of 
$0.10 per share at the beginning of the year, then its earnings for the year 
will be $4.50 and its EPS will be $0.045. In this respect, the corporation can 
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“inflate” its EPS by distributing cash to shareholders via buybacks rather 
than dividends. But again, it is hard to characterize this aspect of buybacks 
as illegitimate. It is equally valid to say that dividends artificially “deflate” 
EPS and that buybacks are a way of returning cash to shareholders that is 
EPS-neutral.151 
One might think that corporations could manipulate EPS by buying 
back shares at the end of a reporting period. Thus, they would be able to 
invest cash (and earn positive returns) over the course of the period and 
then could use that cash to buy back shares and reduce the EPS denomi-
nator at the very end. Fortunately, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board understands this problem and has crafted a definition of EPS that 
addresses it. FASB requires firms following generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) to report EPS on the basis of the weighted-average 
number of shares outstanding for the period.152 Thus, if the corporation 
bought back 10 shares on the last day of the year, its EPS denominator (in 
a non-leap year) would be (364 days x 100 shares + 1 day x 90 shares)/365 
days, or 99.97. There is no obvious EPS benefit to buying back shares at 
the beginning of a period because then the company loses any yield that it 
would have earned on the cash used to finance the buyback, and no obvi-
ous EPS benefit to buying back stock at the tail end because then the effect 
on the weighted average number of shares is negligible.153 
So, while it is true that buybacks almost always increase EPS relative 
to dividends, they do not necessarily increase EPS relative to reinvestment. 
Buybacks increase EPS relative to reinvestment if the opportunity cost of 
the buyback is less than the company’s earnings yield (i.e., earnings per 
share divided by price). If the company in the example above could have 
earned greater than a 5% return by reinvesting the $10 itself, then the 
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buyback effectively reduced EPS. Tying an executive’s compensation to 
EPS encourages buybacks only if the company lacks internal investment 
opportunities that will generate returns exceeding the company’s earnings 
yield.154 
Indeed, buybacks may ultimately have a negative effect on top exec-
utives’ personal interests (relative to reinvestment). First, while buybacks 
do not mechanically reduce a company’s EPS, buybacks—like dividends—
do mechanically reduce the company’s market capitalization (i.e., the price 
of its shares multiplied by the number of outstanding shares). As noted 
above, CEO compensation tends to increase in tandem with market capi-
talization, so in buying back shares, CEOs potentially shrink their own sal-
aries.155 Second, buybacks—like dividends—reduce free cash flow. Sub-
stantial free cash flow potentially allows managers to pursue pet projects, 
purchase plush corporate jets, redecorate their own offices ornately, and 
so on.156 Distributing cash to shareholders thus may come at the expense 
of executive perquisites. 
Just as the effect of buybacks on executive pay is ambiguous, the ef-
fect of buybacks on workers’ wages is similarly unclear. While buyback 
critics often allege that share repurchases hurt workers,157 none of these 
arguments explain why buybacks are any worse than dividends in this re-
gard, and the alternative to buybacks and dividends—retention of earn-
ings—may be even worse. A corporation that retains earnings rather than 
distributing cash to shareholders can use those retained earnings to expand 
horizontally or vertically, swallowing up rivals and other enterprises in re-
lated industries. The resulting concentration of pricing power raises the 
risks of labor-market monopsony and product-market monopoly, poten-
tially allowing employers to depress wages or sellers to inflate prices.158 
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None of this is to suggest that buybacks are always and everywhere 
unproblematic from a policy perspective. For example, Jesse Fried has ar-
gued that managers may initiate buybacks in order to capitalize on private 
information indicating that their company’s shares are undervalued.159 Alt-
hough the managers might in theory buy company stock for their own ac-
counts, they would expose themselves to insider trading liability if they did. 
Instead, they might initiate buybacks and retain their own shares, thereby 
increasing their percentage stake in the corporation. While the Securities 
and Exchange Commission maintains that insider-trading laws apply to 
corporate-share repurchases, Fried argues that lax disclosure requirements 
surrounding buybacks make “insider trading via the corporation” difficult 
to detect.160 
Fried does not suggest that all or even most buybacks result from 
managers’ efforts to capitalize on private information indicating underval-
uation.161 To the extent that weak disclosure rules surrounding buybacks 
allow executives to profit from “insider trading via the corporation,” the 
logical policy prescription would be—as Fried recommends—to bolster 
disclosure requirements.162 Changing the tax treatment of buybacks in or-
der to address the potential for corporate insider trading would be a re-
markably roundabout policy response.163 Note also that buybacks are not 
unique in their vulnerability to insider trading. Executives also can reduce 
their stake in the companies they run by issuing new equity (i.e., selling 
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new shares). Thus, new equity issuances—the polar opposite of buy-
backs—also allow executives to profit from insider trading via the corpo-
ration when executives have negative rather than positive inside infor-
mation about firm prospects. 
B. The Tax Treatment of Buybacks and the Distribution Decision 
Even if one is unpersuaded by our arguments in the previous Section, 
a general antipathy toward corporate cash distributions would be a weak 
reason to support Chirelstein’s proposal. This is because Chirelstein’s pro-
posal will not necessarily discourage—and might well accelerate—corpo-
rate distributions of cash. 
To understand why, a primer on the “new view” of dividend taxation 
is potentially helpful. One key insight of the new view is that a constant tax 
rate on corporate cash distributions to shareholders does not affect the tim-
ing of distributions. All that matters is the relative after-tax rate of return 
on investments inside and outside the corporation. To illustrate: imagine 
that a corporation has $100 of retained earnings and that the tax rate on 
distributions is 20%. The corporation can earn an after-tax return of 5% 
by investing the $100 in new projects, and shareholders can earn an after-
tax return of 5% by investing themselves. Under these circumstances, 
shareholders should be indifferent as to whether the corporation distrib-
utes cash now or in the future. If the corporation distributes cash now, then 
the $100 distribution will be subject to a 20% tax, leaving $80 for share-
holders to invest. If shareholders invest $80 at a 5% after-tax rate of return, 
they will end up with $84 next year. If instead the corporation reinvests the 
$100 at a 5% after-tax rate of return, the investment will grow to $105 next 
year. If the corporation distributes $105 to shareholders then, the distribu-
tion will be subject to a 20% (i.e., $21) tax, and shareholders will end up 
with $84. Either way, shareholders end up in the same position ($84). The 
same general logic would hold if the tax rate on distributions were any 
other figure from 0 to 100%. Assuming that the after-tax rate of return is 
the same inside the corporation and outside, the shareholder ultimately 
ends up in the same position regardless of whether the corporation distrib-
utes earnings today or later on. 
According to the new view,164 shareholders should prefer for the cor-
poration to retain rather than distribute earnings if the corporation’s after-
tax rate of return is higher than the shareholder’s after-tax rate of return. 
That might be the case if the corporation has access to investment oppor-
tunities unavailable to its shareholders individually, or if corporations and 
                                                                                                                                             
 164. See, e.g., MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION (1977); Alan J. 
Auerbach, Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital, 93 Q.J. ECON. 433 (1979); David Brad-
ford, The Incidence and Allocation Effects of a Tax on Corporate Distributions, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 
1 (1981). 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:246 2021 
296 
individuals have access to the same investment opportunities but the in-
come tax rate on corporations is lower than the rate on individuals. The 
latter condition exists today with respect to investments by U.S. corpora-
tions and high-bracket individuals in dividend-yielding and interest-gener-
ating assets: the corporate income tax rate is 21% (effectively half that with 
respect to dividends eligible for the dividends received reduction), while 
the top rate on individuals is 23.8% for long-term capital gains and quali-
fied dividends and 40.8% for short-term capital gains, as well as ordinary 
dividends and other ordinary income. By contrast, shareholders should 
prefer for the corporation to distribute rather than retain earnings if the 
corporation’s after-tax rate of return is lower than the shareholder’s after-
tax rate of return. That condition plausibly exists today for pension plans, 
tax-exempt institutions, and individuals investing through tax-preferred re-
tirement accounts—all of whom face a tax rate of zero on investment in-
come. It also potentially exists for taxable individuals investing in stocks 
with low or zero-dividend yields who plan to hold their investments until 
death. The effective tax rate on capital gains for those individuals is 0%, 
while for corporations it is (as noted above) 21% percent. 
An important caveat to the propositions in the previous paragraphs is 
that taxes on distributions may distort timing if the tax rate is variable. Im-
agine, for example, that the tax rate on corporate cash distributions is 20% 
this year but will be zero next year, and shareholders can invest at a 5% 
after-tax rate of return. If the corporation distributes $100 today, then—as 
illustrated above—the shareholders end up with $84 next year. If the cor-
poration retains the $100 and reinvests it at any after-tax rate of return 
higher than negative 16%, then shareholders will end up with more than 
$84 next year. The expectation that the tax rate on distributions will decline 
next year potentially leads the corporation to retain earnings even when 
doing so is quite inefficient from a non-tax perspective. 
Under certain circumstances, the current tax law’s treatment of buy-
backs interacts with other features of the code to create an expectation of 
declining tax rates on distributions. Imagine a corporation with a single 
shareholder who is a taxable U.S. resident individual. Assume that the in-
dividual’s basis in her shares is low relative to fair market value, so distri-
butions in the form of dividends or buybacks both would generate substan-
tial tax liabilities. However, if the individual holds her shares until death, 
then her heirs’ basis will be stepped up to fair market value and the corpo-
ration can buy back shares without triggering any capital gains-tax liability. 
The shareholder may therefore want the corporation to delay distributions 
even if investment opportunities inside the corporation are significantly 
less attractive than investment opportunities outside. Chirelstein’s 
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proposal would potentially (though only partially165) offset this incentive 
for delay, because the single shareholder’s heirs would be taxed on distri-
butions even if they occurred after basis step-up.166  
To be clear: It is not our claim that Chirelstein’s proposal necessarily 
will accelerate distributions of corporate cash; the effects could go in either 
direction.167 If corporations currently are retaining earnings and delaying 
distributions until pivotal shareholders can benefit from stepped-up basis, 
then Chirelstein’s proposal would potentially accelerate distributions—the 
opposite of what buyback critics appear to want. But Chirelstein’s proposal 
also might cause corporations to delay distributions—either because they 
expect the Chirelstein regime to be temporary and want to wait it out, or 
because Chirelstein’s proposal would turn corporations into more attrac-
tive vehicles for holding stock relative to individual taxable accounts. We 
thus cannot rule out the possibility that Chirelstein’s proposal will achieve 
what buyback critics apparently want (i.e., a drop in distributions), though 
we cannot guarantee that outcome either. 
C. Buybacks and the Lock-In Problem 
Chirelstein’s proposal would go some way toward addressing the fa-
miliar problem of capital gains lock-in, though we do not think this is the 
most powerful argument in the proposal’s favor. In this Section, we first 
explain the lock-in problem and then consider the ways in which Chirel-
stein’s proposal would mitigate it but not eliminate it. 
An example serves to illustrate the lock-in phenomenon: Imagine that 
one share of stock in Company P and one share of stock in Company Q are 
both worth $1. An investor holds 100 shares of stock in Company P with 
basis of $0.50 per share. The investor expects that Company P’s stock will 
increase by 9.5% ($0.095) next year and that Company Q’s stock will in-
crease by 10% ($0.10). Assume a tax rate of 20% on capital gains. 
                                                                                                                                             
 165. We discuss the interaction between stepped-up basis and Chirelstein’s proposal at 
greater length in Section III.D. See infra Section III.D. 
 166. The single-shareholder example is of course not an accurate description of the own-
ership structure of most publicly traded U.S. companies. Those companies will generally have a 
broad range of shareholders, some of whom are tax-exempt institutions or non-U.S. residents. It 
may be possible under current law for the corporation to buy back shares primarily or exclusively 
from tax-exempts and foreigners, thereby avoiding any tax on distributions even before the death 
of a founder and the resulting step-up in basis. 
 167. One way in which Chirelstein’s proposal might delay distributions is by making cor-
porations into more attractive investment vehicles. Recall that under current law, corporations 
can claim a 50% dividends-received deduction that reduces their effective tax rate on dividend 
income to 10.5% (half the statutory rate of 21%). By treating all distributions as dividends rather 
than capital gains, Chirelstein’s proposal would make corporations more attractive vehicles for 
holding equity investments (as corporations generally enjoy a tax advantage relative to individuals 
with respect to dividends but not necessarily with respect to capital gains). This could cause cor-
porations to retain more cash but to reinvest their earnings in other companies’ stock rather than 
in organic growth. 
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Setting tax considerations aside, it is clear that the investor should sell 
her 100 shares of Company P and buy 100 shares of Company Q, since 100 
shares of Q will be worth $110 while 100 shares of P will be worth only 
$109.50. Tax changes the calculus. If the investor sells her stock in P today, 
she will owe capital gains tax of $10 (i.e., the amount realized of $100 minus 
her basis of $50, multiplied by 20%). She will therefore be able to afford 
only 90 shares of stock in Q. Those shares will increase in value to $99 a 
year from now; if she sells those shares then, she will owe an additional 
capital gains tax of $1.80; and she will be left with $97.20. By contrast, if the 
investor holds onto her stock in P for another year and sells it then, her 
amount realized will be $109.50; she will pay tax of $11.90; and she will be 
left with $97.60. Because of tax considerations, the investor has an incen-
tive to hold on to Company P’s stock. She is “locked in” to the lower-per-
forming asset. 
 
Table 7. Illustration of Lock-In Effect 
 Hold P  
(no tax) 
Sell P/Buy 
Q (no tax) 
Hold P  
(20% tax) 
Sell P/Buy Q 
(20% tax) 
Value at 1/1 $100 $100 $100 $90 
Value at 
12/31 
$109.50 $110 $109.50 $99 
Sales pro-
ceeds 
$109.50 $110 $109.50 $99 
Stock basis $50 $100 $50 $90 
Gain $59.50 $10 $59.50 $9 
Tax due N/A N/A $11.90 $1.80 
After-tax 
cash 
$109.50 $110 $97.60 $97.20 
 
The step-up in basis at death makes the lock-in problem worse in 
some ways and better in others. Imagine that our hypothetical investor be-
lieves that she has only twelve more months to live. She can either hold on 
to her stock in Company P, in which case her heirs will be able to sell the 
stock tax-free upon her death, or she can reallocate from P to Q, in which 
case her heirs would be able to sell the stock in Q tax-free upon her death. 
Now the incentive to hold on to Company P’s stock is even stronger. The 
investor would prefer to leave her heirs 100 shares of stock in P with a value 
of $109.50 rather than 90 shares of stock in Q with a value of $99. Indeed, 
the investor would have an incentive to hold on to her shares of stock in P 
even if she expected that the share price of P would decline (though by no 
more than 1%) during the remainder of her life. Note, though, that 
stepped-up basis can also reduce lock-in because after a person’s death, 




The welfare costs of lock-in are two-fold. First, lock-in may lead to the 
misallocation of capital. That is, lock-in may deter investors from reallo-
cating capital away from another lower-performing company and toward a 
new, more efficient company or an existing company raising new capital 
for promising projects. Second, lock-in may discourage investors from di-
versifying their portfolios and may lead them to bear excessive idiosyn-
cratic risks. Imagine, for instance, that Investor J holds 100 shares of stock 
in Company P (worth $1 per share) and Investor K holds 100 shares of 
stock in Company Q (worth $1 per share), and that neither investor has 
any special knowledge as to the trajectory of either company’s stock price. 
J and K would both be better off if J traded 50 shares of P stock to K for 
50 shares of stock in Q, because each would thereby diversify their portfo-
lios and reduce their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. But if the investors’ 
basis in their respective shares is low, they may be deterred by lock-in from 
trading their shares. The upshot is that lock-in can stand in the way of what 
would be—absent tax considerations—Pareto-efficient asset reallocations. 
Lock-in arises from the difference between the fair market value of 
an asset and a shareholder’s basis in that asset: the larger the (positive) 
difference, the larger the lock-in effect. Chirelstein’s proposal mitigates the 
lock-in problem by taxing all shareholders on their pro rata portion of cor-
porate distributions and adjusting basis upwards when that happens. This 
is a virtue of Chirelstein’s approach. Yet importantly, Chirelstein’s pro-
posal does not eliminate lock-in—for two reasons. First, many companies 
will continue to retain at least some earnings under Chirelstein’s regime 
(e.g., because they believe they can earn a higher after-tax rate of return 
by reinvesting earnings inside the corporation than their shareholders can 
earn outside). Earnings retention generally pushes fair market value above 
basis. Second, fair market value will far exceed basis for shareholders in 
many firms not because of earnings retention, but because of earnings ex-
pectations. An early investor in Facebook, for example, would still experi-
ence lock-in under Chirelstein’s proposal—just to a slightly lesser extent.168 
In short, we consider lock-in mitigation to be a benefit of Chirelstein’s pro-
posal but not an overwhelming argument for its adoption.169 
                                                                                                                                             
 168. Facebook’s authorized share repurchases since 2017 totaled $33 billion as of this 
writing. See Patrick Thomas, Facebook Expands Share Buybacks, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2018, 6:25 
PM EST), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-expands-share-buybacks-1544225152 
[https://perma.cc/U6RN-8HDF]. Under Chirelstein’s proposal, a shareholder who bought Face-
book stock for $38 per share at its initial public offering in May 2012 would have a basis of about 
$49 (i.e., $33 billion divided by roughly 3 billion shares equals $11 per share plus $38). Facebook 
was trading at slightly more than $254 per share as of this writing. See Facebook, Inc., YAHOO 
FIN. (Sept. 25, 2020, 4:00 PM EST), https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/FB [https://perma.cc/NDA6-
SQQ9]. 
 169. The EED proposal to neutralize the direct tax consequences between redemptions 
and dividends, previously discussed, see supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text, would 
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D. Buybacks and the Mark Zuckerberg Problem 
One of the most significant benefits of Chirelstein’s proposal is that it 
would reduce the Mark Zuckerberg problem noted earlier. Current law 
allows founders of successful companies to amass tremendous fortunes 
without paying any income tax on those gains by acquiring founder’s stock 
and then holding that stock until they die. Because of the stepped-up basis 
rule, the founder’s heirs can then sell the shares without any income tax 
due.170 During the founder’s life, the corporation can distribute earnings to 
shareholders via buybacks, and the founders will face no tax liability as 
long as they do not redeem their shares. When she desires liquidity, the 
founder can borrow against her stockholdings and extend the terms of 
those loans indefinitely. Zuckerberg, for example, should not face too 
much trouble in finding a financial institution that will lend him all he could 
need for his lifetime consumption secured by his $60 billion of Facebook 
stock. Moreover, the loan plus accrued interest will be a liability of the 
founder’s estate, meaning that it will reduce estate tax when the founder 
dies. As Edward J. McCaffery writes, “the wealthy . . . can literally live a 
tax-free life using Buy/Borrow/Die.”171 
The ability of founders to avoid tax through “Buy/Borrow/Die” is 
problematic from virtually any normative perspective. Founder income 
largely represents a return to entrepreneurial labor, not a return to capital 
investment. In the Facebook case, for example, Zuckerberg’s own capital 
contributions to the company were trivial. While some commentators have 
argued that the optimal tax on capital income is zero (and, indeed, a long 
literature in public finance theory supports that conclusion172), nearly eve-
ryone agrees that labor income should be taxed. Although “Buy/Bor-
row/Die” is arguably the product of a number of individually defensible 
policy choices, the ultimate outcome is exceedingly difficult to justify. 
The most straightforward way to address “Buy/Borrow/Die” is to re-
peal section 1014, the code provision that allows for stepped-up basis at 
death.173 We agree with that prescription, and Chirelstein did too.174 How-
ever, stepped-up basis has been repealed twice before and replaced with 
                                                                                                                                             
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the lock-in effect because it would reduce rather than increase 
stock basis whenever earnings are distributed. See Yale, supra note 19, at 361. 
 170. See I.R.C. § 1014 (2018). 
 171. Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, 70 TAX L. REV. 305, 321 (2017). 
 172. See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 29. 
 173. See Richard Schmalbeck, Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Advocating 
a Carryover Tax Basis Regime, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 110-11 (2017); Jay A. Soled, Rich-
ard A. Schmalbeck & James Alm, Reassessing the Costs of the Stepped-Up Basis Rule, 162 TAX 
NOTES 769, 774 (2019). 
 174. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A GUIDE TO THE 
LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 62 (7th ed. 1994) (“No convincing rationale for the death-basis 




carryover basis, and in both cases, Congress “repealed the repeal.”175 
Mounting concerns about widening wealth inequality might cause stepped-
up basis repeal to “stick” this time, but if the past is prologue, then repeal 
of section 1014 will not solve the Mark Zuckerberg problem provided that 
Zuckerberg outlives the repeal. Moreover, since most of the revenues from 
stepped-up basis repeal would be far in the future, the ten-year revenue 
estimate for replacing stepped-up basis with carryover basis is relatively 
low (about $105 billion over a decade, according to the Congressional 
Budget Office).176 Chirelstein’s proposal, by contrast, would begin to raise 
revenue from high-net-worth founders such as Zuckerberg as soon as their 
companies begin distributing cash.177 Whether or not revenue falls within 
the 10-year window has no obvious policy significance, but it does have 
political significance due to Congress’s inordinate emphasis on 10-year rev-
enue projections. 
None of this is to suggest that Chirelstein’s proposal is a substitute for 
stepped-up basis repeal—rather, the two policies are complementary. 
Moreover, leaving stepped-up basis in place while implementing the 
Chirelstein regime could detract from the efficacy of Chirelstein’s pro-
posal. To illustrate: imagine that a founder who acquired stock for $0 dies 
when shares are worth $100. Upon the founder’s death, her heirs’ basis is 
stepped up to $100. If the corporation then initiated a buyback that re-
sulted in an imputed dividend of $10 per share, the heirs would be taxed 
on the distribution but would now have basis of $110 per share. If the heirs 
redeemed their shares in the buyback or sold their stock immediately 
thereafter, they would have a capital loss of $10 per share. If the heirs had 
net long-term capital gains that could soak up the capital loss, then the 
overall tax impact of the buyback would be neutral: the heirs would pay 
tax on an imputed dividend of $10 (versus zero under current law) but 
would recapture that tax when they deduct their capital loss. If the heirs 
had net short-term capital gains but not net long-term capital gains in their 
basket, then they would actually win from Chirelstein’s proposal, since the 
tax on the imputed dividend (23.8% x $10 per share = $2.38, assuming that 
they are in the top bracket) would be less than the value of the capital loss 
(40.8% x $10 per share = $4.08). 
 
                                                                                                                                             
 175. McCaffery, supra note 171, at 320 (discussing the fate of stepped-up basis repeal 
provisions in 1980 and 2001 legislation). 
 176. See Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2019 to 2028, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 219 (Dec. 
2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-06/54667-budgetoptions-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8L9N-7LHL]. 
 177. The EED proposal to neutralize the direct tax consequences between dividends and 
redemptions would not have this salutary effect because the EED tax would have no impact on 
nonredeemers. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text. Thus, as under current law, the 
Zuckerbergs of the world can simply choose to not redeem and avoid the EED tax, whereas under 
the Chirelstein proposal they would be taxed whenever the corporation buys back stock from any 
shareholders. 
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Table 8. Illustration of Interaction Between Chirelstein Proposal and 
Stepped-Up Basis Rule 
 Current law Chirelstein Proposal 
Value of shares $100 $100 
Redemption effect  N/A $10 dividend 
Redemption tax $0 $2.38 
Basis after redemption $100 $110 
Sales proceeds $100 $100 
Loss on sale $0 ($10) 
Tax benefit of loss if offsets net 
long-term capital gain 
$0 $2.38 
Tax benefit of loss if offsets net 
short-term capital gain 
$0 $4.08 
Net tax consequence if offsets 
net long-term capital gain 
$0 $0 
Net tax consequence if offsets 
net short-term capital gain 
$0 $1.70 tax reduction 
 
Nevertheless, in practice we expect that Chirelstein’s proposal still 
would raise significant revenue from founders and their heirs even if the 
stepped-up basis rule is retained or resurrected. Under current law, a 
founder’s heirs can replicate the results of “Buy/Borrow/Die” through “In-
herit/Borrow/Die”: they avoid realizing any gains during their lifetimes, 
borrow against appreciated stock for liquidity, and repay loans only after 
death and basis step-up. If capital gains taxes are essentially irrelevant to 
heirs, then the fact that Chirelstein’s proposal reduces capital gains taxes 
on heirs (but not below zero178) is essentially irrelevant too. In sum, Chirel-
stein’s proposal is likely to mitigate the Mark Zuckerberg problem even if 
stepped-up basis remains, and if stepped-up basis is repealed permanently, 
Chirelstein’s proposal still would serve the salutary purpose of alleviating 
(though not eliminating) lock-in. 
E. Buybacks and the Panama Papers Problem 
Chirelstein’s proposal further serves to address what we previously 
termed “the Panama Papers problem.” Because current law exempts cap-
ital gains, but not dividends, realized by foreign holders of U.S. stock, high-
net-worth individuals from around the world can accumulate significant 
gains from U.S. equity investments without paying any tax anywhere. They 
do this by purchasing publicly traded U.S. stocks that pay zero or low 
                                                                                                                                             
 178. Recall that capital losses can offset only capital gains and up to $3,000 of ordinary 
income. See I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2018). Losses are in this sense “nonrefundable”: a capital loss can 
be carried forward indefinitely, but without taxable income to offset, it is essentially worthless.  
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dividends through entities in tax haven jurisdictions. As a result, zero- or 
low-dividend-yield U.S. stocks offer an attractive place for tax dodgers to 
park their cash. 
The magnitude of the Panama Papers problem is staggering. Econo-
mist Gabriel Zucman has estimated that individuals and firms in tax havens 
held 9% of all U.S.-listed equities as of 2013.179 If that percentage holds 
today over a total of $40.6 trillion in U.S. equity issuances, it would mean 
that more than $3.65 trillion in U.S. equities lie in the hands of tax haven 
investors.180 One can argue with Zucman’s figures at the margins (for ex-
ample, his definition of tax havens is certainly contestable181), but it is dif-
ficult to disbelieve the fact that a significant slice of U.S. equities are held 
by investors in very low-tax jurisdictions—often out of sight of authorities 
in investors’ home countries. When U.S.-listed corporations distribute cash 
to shareholders via buybacks, they effectively allow tax haven investors to 
earn returns tax-free. 
Chirelstein’s proposal would close this opportunity by extending the 
withholding tax to all cash distributions—dividends as well as buybacks. 
High-net-worth individuals still might (and indeed, likely would) use off-
shore entities to avoid home country tax authorities, but they would have 
to pay U.S. tax if they wanted to park their hidden wealth in U.S. equi-
ties.182 The near-term revenue gain would be substantial: assuming a 30% 
withholding rate, a 2.5% buyback rate,183 and $3.65 trillion of tax haven 
equity investments, the revenue gain from tax haven investors alone would 
be in the range of $27 billion per year. Again, there is no indication that 
Chirelstein—writing before the rise of tax-haven investing—anticipated 
this benefit. This is one more way in which Chirelstein’s proposal has found 
a new justification in its later life. 
Importantly, our estimate of revenue gains from tax-haven investors 
assumes that implementation of Chirelstein’s proposal does not affect the 
share of U.S. equities held in tax havens. It is possible that tax-haven in-
vestors, faced with higher effective tax rates under Chirelstein’s proposal, 
                                                                                                                                             
 179. Gabriel Zucman, Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate 
Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 137 (2014). 
 180. See Rosenthal & Burke, supra note 68, at 14 (reporting U.S. equity issuances of 
$40.581 trillion in 2019). 
 181. See, e.g., Conor Clarke, What Are Tax Havens and Why Are They Bad?, 95 TEX. 
L. REV. 59, 67-68 (2016) (reviewing GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE 
SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS (2015)). 
 182. On the role of onshore financial centers such as the United States in facilitating 
offshore tax evasion, see Daniel Hemel, What’s the Matter with Luxembourg?, NEW RAMBLER 
REV. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/economics/what-s-the-matter-
with-luxembourg [https://perma.cc/DM22-YVGZ], which reviews ZUCMAN, supra note 181. 
 183. See Edward Yardeni, Joe Abbott & Mali Quintana, Corporate Finance Briefing: 
S&P 500 Buybacks & Dividends, YADENI RES., INC. 9 fig.10 (Nov. 6, 2020), 
https://www.yardeni.com/pub/bbdivepsyield.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2LK-E8XV]. 
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would reallocate their portfolios toward other markets. In that case, our 
back-of-the-envelope estimate of revenue raised from tax-haven investors 
would be an overestimate. This caveat, though, comes with two qualifica-
tions of its own. First, we know very little about the price elasticity of de-
mand for U.S. equities among tax-haven investors. It may be that the rela-
tive safety and strong performance of U.S. equities over time induces tax-
haven investors to retain U.S. stocks even when the tax advantages decline. 
Second, U.S. stocks constitute more than half of the global equity mar-
ket.184 Investors interested in diversification therefore may decide to retain 
U.S. equities notwithstanding tax disadvantages because diversification 
benefits outweigh tax costs. 
Chirelstein’s proposal—unlike several other changes to capital taxa-
tion such as the repeal of stepped-up basis or a move to a mark-to-market 
system—also would raise revenue from foreign investors in non-tax-haven 
jurisdictions in the near term.185 Tax treaties generally allow the United 
States to tax foreign residents on dividends from U.S. corporations but not 
on capital gains from the sale of U.S. companies’ stock.186 “Dividends” are 
defined to include income that is taxed like a dividend when received by a 
U.S. resident.187 By treating buybacks as dividends with respect to U.S. res-
idents, the United States would likely gain the right to treat buybacks as 
dividends with respect to foreign resident shareholders (and to tax them 
accordingly). By contrast, the United States almost certainly would not be 
able—under existing tax treaties—to extend mark-to-market treatment to 
foreign shareholders or to tax foreigners on capital gains at death.188 
The application of Chirelstein’s proposal to foreign investors in non-
tax-haven jurisdictions is normatively more complicated than its applica-
tion to tax-haven holdings. In many cases, the investors themselves would 
be unaffected by the change because their home-country government 
would give them a dollar-for-dollar credit equal to the tax that they paid to 
                                                                                                                                             
 184. See Brian J. Scott, Kimberly Stockton & Scott J. Donaldson, Global Equity Invest-
ing: The Benefits of Diversification and Sizing Your Allocation, VANGUARD RES. 2 (Feb. 2019), 
https://www.vanguard.com/pdf/ISGGEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/22XV-2ZTB] (estimating that U.S. 
equities accounted for 55.1% of the global equity market in 2018). 
 185. The Andrews corporate excise tax and Yin corporate distribution tax proposals dis-
cussed above, see supra note 130, would have this feature too. Both proposals would effectively 
impose a U.S. tax on stock repurchases even when those repurchases were from foreign share-
holders. 
 186. See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, 1 Tax 
Treaties (CCH) ¶ 209.10, art. 10(1) (2020) (allowing the taxation of foreign residents on divi-
dends); id. art. 13(6) (limiting the taxation of foreign residents on capital gains). 
 187. See id. art. 10(5) (defining “dividends” to include any “income that is subjected to 
the same taxation treatment as income from shares under the laws of the State of which the payer 
is a resident”). 




the United States.189 The near-term revenue gain to the United States 
would be substantial though: based on data suggesting that approximately 
40% of U.S. equities are held by foreigners, subtracting out the 9% in tax 
havens, assuming a 15% withholding rate, and again projecting a buyback 
rate of 2.5% over a total of $40.6 trillion in U.S. equity issuances, we esti-
mate a revenue gain of approximately $47 billon per year.190 The net effect 
would be a redistribution of wealth from the home country government to 
the U.S. government rather than a change in the total amount of tax that 
the investor pays. Whether the United States should be in the business of 
siphoning off revenue from its overseas trading partners is a question that 
we bracket for the time being.191 If this outcome is objectionable, the 
United States can—at least in theory—neutralize it through government-
to-government transfers. The efficacy of a strategy aimed at shifting reve-
nue from foreign governments to the United States also is open to ques-
tion: foreign governments ultimately may respond by adopting versions of 
Chirelstein’s proposal themselves, thereby raising revenue from U.S. resi-
dents who hold foreign equities. The more easily defensible claim, we 
think, is that the United States ought to ensure that high-net-worth indi-
viduals who hide wealth in tax haven jurisdictions should pay some tax on 
their U.S. equity gains. Chirelstein’s proposal—while not designed to in-
crease the effective tax rate on tax-haven holders of U.S. stock—would 
likely have that salubrious effect.192 
IV. Beyond Buybacks 
Our analysis so far has evaluated Chirelstein’s proposal as a piecemeal 
reform of the federal income-tax system that leaves other elements in 
place. Chirelstein’s proposal provides a partial solution to the Mark Zuck-
erberg problem (the effective nontaxation of the labor income of firm 
                                                                                                                                             
 189. See Guide to Going Global: Tax—Full Handbook, DLA PIPER 249 (Sept. 28, 2020), 
https://www.dlapiperintelligence.com/goingglobal/tax/handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL 
U3-N5JE]. 
 190. The 15% withholding rate is based on tax treaties. The overall estimate of a $74 
billion per year revenue effect ($27 billion from foreigners in tax haven jurisdictions plus $47 bil-
lion from foreigners in non-tax-haven jurisdictions), see supra note 25 and accompanying text, 
assumes (very conservatively) that gains from mitigating the Mark Zuckerberg problem offset 
losses from the reduced rate on dividends received by C corporations in buybacks. 
 191. On the role of national interest in U.S. tax policy, see Michael J. Graetz, The David 
R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, 
and Unsatisfactory Policy, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001), which discusses the interplay between ge-
opolitical developments and international income taxation. 
 192. The EED proposal to neutralize the direct tax consequences between dividends and 
redemptions, see supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text, would not have this effect because 
under that proposal, (i) redeemers are still treated as recognizing capital gains, and (ii) nonre-
deemers are unaffected. In fact, the EED proposal could, depending on the technical details of its 
implementation, exacerbate the Panama Papers problem because it might treat all transactions 
that are dividends under current law as constructive sales yielding capital gains, which are exempt 
from U.S. tax when recognized by foreigners. 
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founders) and a partial solution to the Panama Papers problem (the use of 
U.S. equity markets by tax-haven investors to generate tax-free returns). 
No one would argue, though, that Chirelstein’s proposal fixes all of the 
federal income-tax system’s flaws—or even all of the flaws in the status quo 
treatment of equity returns. In this Part, we consider potential interactions 
between Chirelstein’s proposal and more sweeping reforms. We conclude 
by reflecting on the limits and merits of incrementalism in tax policy and 
tax law scholarship. 
A. Buybacks and Rate Equalization 
One oft-discussed reform to capital taxation is rate equalization: an 
end to the preferential rate for long-term capital gains and qualified divi-
dends. All of the leading 2020 Democratic presidential candidates—includ-
ing Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Pete Buttigieg, Elizabeth Warren, Amy 
Klobuchar, and Mike Bloomberg—said they would tax capital gains and 
dividends at the same rate as ordinary income, at least for the highest in-
come households.193 Chirelstein’s proposal would be complementary—and 
indeed, integral—to such a shift. 
Proposals to tax qualified dividends and long-term capital gains at the 
same rate as ordinary income have obvious appeal in an era of wide wealth 
inequality. In 2016, according to IRS data, long-term capital gains and 
qualified dividends taxed at preferential rates accounted for 3% of all in-
come reported by taxpayers in the bottom 95% of the income distribution, 
rising to 71% for taxpayers in the top 0.001% of the income distribution.194 
Ordinary investors tend to hold all or most of their stock in tax-preferred 
accounts, such as IRAs and 401(k)s, and therefore would be largely unaf-
fected by a capital gains increase. Increasing the capital gains rate therefore 
seems like a well-targeted tax increase on the well-to-do, and the current 
capital gains rate preference of 17% appears to be awfully ripe for the pick-
ing. 
This analysis, however, neglects to consider behavioral responses by 
taxpayers to a significant increase in the capital gains rate. As noted above, 
                                                                                                                                             
 193. See, e.g., Brian Faler, Bloomberg Targets the Rich with His Tax Plan, but More 
Gently than Some of His Rivals, POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2020, 12:30 PM EST), https://www.polit-
ico.com/news/2020/02/01/michael-bloomberg-tax-plan-110105 [https://perma.cc/XY86-]; Capital 
Gains Taxes, POLITICO (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.politico.com/2020-election/candidates-views-
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capital gains are currently imposed only upon a realization event, such as 
a sale. In addition, capital losses recognized on the sale of depreciated as-
sets can be used to offset capital gains recognized on the sale of appreciated 
assets. This means that selective realizations can be used to avoid paying 
current capital gains tax. Stepped-up basis at death exacerbates this prob-
lem, but even if that were eliminated, taxpayers could substantially reduce 
the effective tax rate on equity returns by delaying realization and defer-
ring tax.195 
Raising the tax rate on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends 
without changing other features of federal income-tax law would thus have 
relatively muted revenue effects. The Penn Wharton Budget Model pre-
dicts that the revenue-maximizing tax rate on capital gains under current 
law is approximately 33%; rate increases beyond that threshold would not 
raise additional revenue and ultimately would reduce revenue.196 The rev-
enue-maximizing rate would be higher—approximately 42%, according to 
the Penn Wharton Budget Model’s estimates—if stepped-up basis at death 
were eliminated and death were treated as a realization event.197 Notably, 
though, the 42% figure is still below the top tax rate on capital gains pro-
posed by the leading 2020 Democratic contenders.198 Chirelstein’s proposal 
would likely push that revenue-maximizing rate higher than 42%, as inves-
tors could no longer avoid tax during their lifetimes by purchasing stock in 
companies that return earnings to shareholders via buybacks rather than 
dividends. And the harder it is to avoid a tax, the higher the revenue-max-
imizing rate. 
B. Buybacks and an End to Realization 
A more substantial reform to capital taxation than simply increasing 
the statutory rate would be to end the realization requirement altogether. 
One such proposal is for mark-to-market taxation: for assets that taxpayers 
                                                                                                                                             
 195. To illustrate: imagine that the return on equity capital is 10% per year and the tax 
rate is 40%. After 10 years, an investment of $100 would be worth $259.37, and if realized, would 
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 196. See John Ricco, The Revenue-Maximizing Capital Gains Tax Rate: With and With-
out Stepped-up Basis at Death, PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL (Dec. 4, 2019), https://budget-
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hold year-to-year, taxpayers would owe tax each year on any increase in 
value from January 1 to December 31.199 Results similar to mark-to-market 
taxation could be achieved by delaying the assessment of tax until realiza-
tion but imposing a surcharge designed to negate any tax benefit from de-
ferral—a proposal known as “retrospective capital gains taxation.”200 In a 
mark-to-market world, domestic taxable investors would be essentially in-
different between buybacks and dividends, because any year-to-year in-
crease in a stock’s value would be taxed in full. Thus, for purposes of do-
mestic taxation, Chirelstein’s proposal and mark-to-market taxation are 
substitutes rather than complements. 
As noted above, though, the analysis changes significantly once for-
eign investors enter the picture. Because tax treaties generally allow the 
United States to tax U.S.-source dividends but bar the United States from 
taxing foreign investors on capital gains (while following home-country 
definitions of dividends and capital gains),201 mark-to-market taxation of 
capital gains would raise little revenue from non-U.S. investors. Reclassi-
fying buybacks as dividends, by contrast, would bring foreign shareholders 
of zero-dividend U.S. corporations within reach of the U.S. tax system. 
Once again, this outcome raises difficult normative questions,202 but it is far 
from duplicative of mark-to-market taxation. 
C. Buybacks and Tax Incrementalism 
Chirelstein’s proposal would still leave gaps in the United States’s 
capital taxation regime. Founders of firms that retain earnings rather than 
distributing cash to shareholders via buybacks or dividends still could avoid 
taxation on what is essentially labor income for their whole lives. Tax ha-
ven investors would be subject to U.S. tax whenever firms in which they 
own equity repurchase shares, but they still could earn tax-free returns on 
investments in U.S. corporate debt.203 Other well-acknowledged flaws in 
the U.S. system of capital taxation—such as the nontaxation of life insur-
ance buildup204—would linger as well. 
The Chirelstein proposal is thus an incremental reform rather than a 
structural overhaul. Our endorsement of the Chirelstein proposal should 
not be understood to imply that reform ought to proceed incrementally. 
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At the same time, there is a danger in thinking exclusively in terms of struc-
tural overhaul: it may leave us unprepared to identify and capitalize upon 
windows for incremental improvements. In an era of often-divided govern-
ment, opportunities for incremental reform are likely to be relatively more 
frequent (though still absolutely rare) than opportunities for vast structural 
change to the tax system. Chirelstein’s buyback proposal—because of its 
bipartisan appeal—may exert a special attraction. Focusing intently—
though not exclusively—on incremental reforms such as Chirelstein’s buy-
back proposal can put us in a better position to seize the day when chances 
for smaller-scope changes present themselves. 
There is another respect in which our endorsement of the Chirel-
stein’s proposal is incrementalist. This Article innovates upon Chirelstein’s 
50-year-old framework rather than charting an entirely new course for the 
taxation of buybacks. Our innovations are, we believe, real improvements 
on the original. We think, for example, that our proposed basis-adjustment 
method and our 43-cents-on-the-dollar rule would make Chirelstein’s pro-
posal more straightforward from an administrative and compliance per-
spective. And—most importantly—the connections we draw between 
Chirelstein’s proposal and the Mark Zuckerberg and Panama Papers prob-
lems give normative force to a proposal that was previously long on ele-
gance and short on justification. All the while, we recognize—and empha-
size—that we are standing on the shoulders of a giant. 
Incrementalism of this variety has a different sort of value. The fasci-
nation with novelty and the fear of preemption in tax-law academia en-
courage authors to seek out new ideas where old ideas might suit well or 
better. Chirelstein’s proposal is, we have argued, an ingenious idea that 
arrived before its time. The intellectual hypothesis motivating our Article 
is that often (though certainly not always) the best ideas were already 
thought, and that much progress can be made by plumbing tax law schol-
arship’s past. The proof of this proposition is ultimately in the pudding, and 
Chirelstein’s proposal is—we think—one data point in its favor. 
Conclusion 
Marvin Chirelstein’s half-century-old proposal to tax buybacks as div-
idends has garnered relatively little attention from tax law academics de-
spite the irrefutable economic similarity between the two transactions and 
the technical elegance of Chirelstein’s solution. Nevertheless, after passing 
its fiftieth anniversary, the proposal is due for a new life—though for dif-
ferent reasons than those cited by Chirelstein. While parity for parity’s 
sake is not an altogether convincing argument, the Chirelstein proposal 
would mitigate fundamental problems that currently plague the federal in-
come system. Given the explosive growth of buybacks and the bipartisan 
antipathy towards them, the Chirelstein proposal also has the virtue of be-
ing politically realistic in an era when partisan polarization potentially puts 
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more sweeping reforms out of reach. Chirelstein’s proposal was an idea 
ahead of its time. More than fifty years later, time has finally caught up. 
